Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico

Abstract

In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.

The Sustainability of Mexican Municipal Public Debt

“…However, these efforts have not reduced tax revenue centralization. On average, approximately 85 percent of state and municipality revenues still depend on federal transfers, whereas nearly 8.4 percent are local government revenues [26]. Furthermore, the reform allowed the subnational governments to borrow from development and commercial banks under market conditions [25].…”

Highway Politics in a Divided Government: Evidence from Mexico

“…Controlling the chamber of deputies is therefore crucial for policy making. In 2002 for example, a year before federal legislative elections, the deputies authorized an extra 5.55% on the initial executive budget proposal (Abbott et al, 2017) as formula-based allocations and term limitations, intergovernmental social transfers in Mexico are found to respond to political motivations (Abbott et al, 2017;Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling, 2008). Given the increased political interests for road infrastructure and its potentially transformative impact on the economy (Blankespoor et al, 2017), we focus on highway investment and political outcomes.…”

On the political economy of resource rents distribution

“…Larcinese et al (2006),Kauder et al (2016), Jarocinska (20102022),Dellmuth et al (2017), Diaz- Cayeros et al (2008,Arulampalam et al (2009), andBrollo andNannicini (2012) provide evidence to support the core voters model, whileVeiga and Pinho (2007),Abbott et al (2017),Banful (2011), andFumey and Egwaikhide (2019) provide evidence to support the swing voters model.6 In any case, ambiguity persists concerning whether partisan alignment translates into electoral advantages for the ruling party(Dey & Sen 2016).…”