Indefinite extensibility and the principle of sufficient reason

Hall, Geoffrey

doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01441-y

Cited by 3 publications

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References 17 publications

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“…5 For an argument that the PSR leads to necessitarianism see van Inwagen (1983: 202-204) as cited in (Della Rocca 2010: 9, fn.13). For a contemporary version of the argument see Samuel Levey (2016: 399-400) as cited in Hall (2021). See also McDaniel (2019) for an updated version of van Inwagen's argument, which supposedly avoids the pitfalls of his earlier one.…”

Section: §1 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There Reason to Believe the Principle of Sufficient Reason?

Walters

2021

Philosophia

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Shamik Dasgupta (2016) proposes to tame the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to apply to only non-autonomous facts, which are facts that are apt for explanation. Call this strategy to tame the PSR the taming strategy. In a recent paper, Della Rocca (2020a) argues that proponents of the taming strategy, in attempting to formulate a restricted version of the PSR, nevertheless find themselves committed to endorsing a form of radical monism, which, in turn, leads right back to an untamed-PSR. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Della Rocca is right. My question is this:Is there reason to believe the principle of sufficient reason (in its untamed version)?In this paper, I argue that it is impossible for there to be a reason to believe the untamed-PSR.

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Section: §1 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There Reason to Believe the Principle of Sufficient Reason?

Walters

2021

Philosophia

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The PSR and the Nature of Explanation: An Underrated Response to Modal Fatalism

Blado

2023

Can. J. of Philosophy

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The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) says every fact has an explanation. But van Inwagen argues the PSR is false—otherwise all facts are necessary facts. Consider the conjunction of all contingent facts, which we can call the Big Contingent Conjunction. If every fact has an explanation, then presumably the Big Contingent Conjunction had better have an explanation too. But what fact could explain its truth—is the Big Contingent Conjunction explained by a necessary fact or a contingent one? Trouble ensues either way. If the Big Contingent Conjunction is explained by a necessary fact, then it is hard to see why it should be contingent. (After all, if something follows from what is necessary, it too would seem to be necessary.) On the other hand, if the Big Contingent Conjunction is explained by a contingent fact, then the explanation appears circular since the explanans itself is among the facts it explains in the Big Contingent Conjunction. This paper explores an assumption of this argument rarely subjected to scrutiny—namely, the distribution principle, which asserts that if a fact explains a conjunction, then it explains each of its conjuncts. Though superficially plausible, close consideration of this principle reveals some reasons to reject it, potentially saving the PSR from van Inwagen’s challenge.

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Russell–Myhill and grounding

Kment

2021

Analysis

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The Russell-Myhill paradox (RMP) puts pressure on the Russellian structured view of propositions (structurism) by showing that it conflicts with certain prima facie attractive ontological and logical principles. I describe several versions of RMP and argue that structurists can appeal to natural assumptions about metaphysical grounding to provide independent reasons for rejecting the ontological principles used in these paradoxes. It remains a task for future work to extend this grounding-based approach to all variants of RMP.

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Indefinite extensibility and the principle of sufficient reason

Cited by 3 publications

References 17 publications

Is There Reason to Believe the Principle of Sufficient Reason?

Is There Reason to Believe the Principle of Sufficient Reason?

The PSR and the Nature of Explanation: An Underrated Response to Modal Fatalism

Russell–Myhill and grounding

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