Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples

Haji, Ishtiyaque

doi:10.1080/13869799908520964

Cited by 73 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Rest assured that P in no way influences the indeterministic decision-making process that actually issues in Bob's decision….Given further details…Bob, in the actual world, W, would appear to be morally responsible for deciding to t2 to steal Ann's car. (Haji 2006, p. 88, note omitted) 23 In reply, it is not evident why a proponent of the luck objection should accept the view that an agent, such as Bob, in an ''indeterministic'' Frankfurt case, is morally responsible for his decision (Haji 1999, pp. 271-274, 2006.…”

Section: On Luck and Antecedent Proximal Controlmentioning

confidence: 97%

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Haji¹

2012

J Ethics

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This paper highlights and discusses some key positions on free will and moral responsibility that I have defended. I begin with reflections on a Strawsonian analysis of moral responsibility. Then I take up objections to the view that there is an asymmetry in freedom requirements for moral responsibility and moral obligation: obligation but not responsibility requires that we could have done otherwise. I follow with some thoughts on the viability of different sorts of semi-compatibilism. Next, I turn to defending the ''luck objection'' to a popular libertarian account of the control that responsibility requires. This is, roughly, the objection that when our decisions are indeterministically caused, their occurrence is a matter of responsibility-undermining luck. Finally, I comment on Frankfurt examples.

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Section: On Luck and Antecedent Proximal Controlmentioning

confidence: 97%

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Haji¹

2012

J Ethics

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“…But the problem of luck has been presented by various contemporary critics of libertarian theories. See, for instance, Waller (1988), Haji (1999), Mele (1999Mele ( , 2006, van Inwagen (2000), Strawson (2000), Clarke (2002), and Allen (2005). ]…”

Section: The Problem Of Luckmentioning

confidence: 98%

Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

Lemos

2010

Philosophia

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In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47: [43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56] 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane's event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane's theory and I explain Griffith's critique of it. I argue that Griffith's criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane's view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith's objections.Keywords Free will . Responsibility . Libertarianism . Robert Kane . Meghan Griffith Determinism is the view that every event that occurs, including human decisions and actions, is necessitated by earlier events and the laws of nature. So, for instance, according to determinism the words and phrases that I use to express myself right now as I write this essay are chosen by me due to mental processes and events that occur as they do because they are determined by prior events and those events were in turn necessitated by even earlier events and so on. Compatibilists believe that determinism is compatible with the existence of human freedom and responsibility. That is, even if all events in the universe are necessitated by earlier events then we can still exhibit freedom in our decisions, choices, and actions and we can still be responsible for them. Libertarians, on the other hand, believe in the existence of human freedom and responsibility, but they believe it is inconsistent with determinism. According to libertarians, if there is human freedom and responsibility, then at least some of the decisions, choices, and actions we commit must not be necessitated by earlier events.

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“…The ensurance formulation of the luck argument has been most clearly and forcefully presented by Haji (1999Haji ( , 2001. The core idea beyond this formulation is that if an agent performs an undetermined action u at t, then she could not have ensured or guaranteed that she u-ed rather than w-ed at t. I believe that something like this thought is behind most philosophers' suspicion that indeterminism is inimical to control.…”

Section: The Ensurance Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It seems that indeterministic events are, by nature, chancy, and this seems to imply that any of our actions that are undetermined are matters of luck for us. The luck argument (Haji 1999(Haji , 2001Hobart 1934;Hume 2000;Mele 1999aMele , b, 2006van Inwagen 2000) seeks to regiment these intuitions about luck and control into a rigorous argument that purports to show that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with indeterminism. The closely related Mind argument (van Inwagen 1983, pp.…”

Section: The Luck (And Mind) Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument

Franklin

2010

Philos Stud

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In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism-features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments-and showing why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as ''deliberative libertarianism'') will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails.

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Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples

Cited by 73 publications

References 16 publications

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument

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