Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective

Forbes, Graeme

doi:10.2307/2185328

Cited by 103 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…This view is similar in certain ways to views developed byForbes (1987) and the earlyKaplan (1968Kaplan ( -1969. But the 'contextually appropriate' qualifier sets this view apart from those earlier views, and as we'll presently see, this qualifier is a crucial part of the theory.…”

supporting

confidence: 66%

Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?

Balaguer

2011

Philos Stud

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It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neoFregeanism, and vice versa. And (ii) for each such pair of theories, there is no fact of the matter as to which of them is superior; or more precisely, they are tied in terms of factual accuracy. These are sweeping claims that cannot be fully justified in a single paper. But arguments are given here that motivate these theses, i.e., that suggest that they are very likely true.

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supporting

confidence: 66%

Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?

Balaguer

2011

Philos Stud

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“…I think that most belief ascriptions involving indexicals and names are de re and that they require an analysis different from the one I offered in the last section for (6) and (7); the view I will offer here is similar to the views developed by the early Kaplan (1968Kaplan ( -1969 and Forbes (1987), but as we will see, my view is also importantly different from those views.…”

Section: De Re Ascriptionsmentioning

confidence: 63%

Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions

Balaguer

2005

Synthese

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I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form 'S believes that p') and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke's 'London'-'Londres' puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism. Synthese (2005) 146: 325-355

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“…13 Perry (1979) called these 'propositions of limited accessibility'. For a particularly clear neo-Fregean account of such propositions and their role in belief, see Forbes (1987). 14 One might admit this, but go on to argue that since Tim and Tom exemplify different individual essences, or haecceities, their worlds are physically discernible after all.…”

Section: The Incompatibility Of the Doctrine Of Propositions And Globmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience

Feit

2006

Philos Stud

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Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective

Cited by 103 publications

References 4 publications

Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?

Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?

Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions

The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience

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