Indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ conditionals

Egan, Suzanne; García-Madruga, Juan A.; Byrne, Ruth M. J.

doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2009.07.005

Cited by 19 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…In order to account for these two main empirical results, we have proposed an explanation that combines some aspects of other studies (Carriedo, García-Madruga, Moreno, & Gutiérrez, 1999;Egan, Byrne, & García-Madruga, 2007;García-Madruga, Gutiérrez, Carriedo, Moreno, & Johnson-Laird, 2002;García-Madruga, Moreno, Quelhas & Juhos, 2007). This proposal suggests that reasoners understand only if by thinking about two possibilities or models, as proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), but in the directional way proposed by .…”

Section: Conditional Reasoning and Mental Model Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Unless Reasoning

et al. 2008

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We report the results of two experiments investigating conditional inferences from conditional unless assertions, such as Juan is not in León unless Nuria is in Madrid. Experiments 1 and 2 check Fillenbaum's hypothesis about the semantic similarity of unless with if not and only if assertions; both also examine inferential endorsements (Experiment 1) and endorsements and latencies (Experiment 2) of the four logically equivalent conditional formulations: if A then B, if not-B then not-A, A only if B and not-A unless B. The results of these experiments show the similarity of unless and only if, confirming that the representation of both conditionals from the outset probably include two possibilities directionally oriented from B to A; results also confirm the especial difficulty of unless assertions. The implications of the results are discussed in the context of recent psychological and linguistic theories of the meaning of unless.

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Section: Conditional Reasoning and Mental Model Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Unless Reasoning

et al. 2008

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“…People make more inferences that require access to “there were no oranges and no pears” from the counterfactual compared to the factual indicative conditional, such as modus tollens (from “there were no pears” to “therefore there were no oranges”). But they also make the same frequency of inferences that require access to “there were oranges and pears” from both conditionals, such as modus ponens – from “there were oranges” to “therefore there were pears” (e.g., Byrne and Tasso, 1999; Thompson and Byrne, 2002; see also Moreno-Ríos et al, 2008; Egan et al, 2009). They do so for various different sorts of content (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012; see also Quelhas and Byrne, 2003; Egan and Byrne, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

The Comprehension of Counterfactual Conditionals: Evidence From Eye-Tracking in the Visual World Paradigm

et al. 2019

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Three experiments tracked participants’ eye-movements to examine the time course of comprehension of the dual meaning of counterfactuals, such as “if there had been oranges then there would have been pears.” Participants listened to conditionals while looking at images in the visual world paradigm, including an image of oranges and pears that corresponds to the counterfactual’s conjecture, and one of no oranges and no pears that corresponds to its presumed facts, to establish at what point in time they consider each one. The results revealed striking individual differences: some participants looked at the negative image and the affirmative one, and some only at the affirmative image. The first experiment showed that participants who looked at the negative image increased their fixation on it within half a second. The second experiment showed they do so even without explicit instructions, and the third showed they do so even for printed words.

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“…The willingness of participants to make inferences such as modus ponens and modus tollens from counterfactuals has been examined not only for basic concrete content, such as conditionals about people in places (e.g., Byrne & Tasso, ) but also for other sorts of content, such as causal and definitional counterfactuals (e.g., Frosch & Byrne, ; Thompson & Byrne, ), and deontic and inducement counterfactuals (e.g., Egan & Byrne, ; Quelhas & Byrne, ). They make such inferences for counterfactuals based on various linguistic forms including “there would have been roses only if there had been orange trees” and “ even if there had been roses there would have been orange trees” (e.g., Egan, Garcia‐Madruga, & Byrne, ; Moreno‐Rios, Garcia‐Madruga, & Byrne, ). The dual meaning of counterfactuals has been examined for counterfactuals about the past, and also subjunctive conditionals about the present, and pre‐factual conditionals about the future (e.g., Byrne & Egan, ; Byrne & Tasso, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking About the Opposite of What Is Said: Counterfactual Conditionals and Symbolic or Alternate Simulations of Negation

Espino

Byrne

2018

Cognitive Science

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When people understand a counterfactual such as “if the flowers had been roses, the trees would have been orange trees,” they think about the conjecture, “there were roses and orange trees,” and they also think about its opposite, the presupposed facts. We test whether people think about the opposite by representing alternates, for example, “poppies and apple trees,” or whether models can contain symbols, for example, “no roses and no orange trees.” We report the discovery of an inference‐to‐alternates effect—a tendency to make an affirmative inference that refers to an alternate even from a negative minor premise, for example, “there were no orange trees, therefore there were poppies.” Nine experiments show the inference‐to‐alternates effect occurs in a binary context, but not a multiple context, and for direct and indirect reference; it can be induced and reduced by prior experience with similar inferences, and it also occurs for indicative conditionals. The results have implications for theories of counterfactual conditionals, and of negation.

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Indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ conditionals

Cited by 19 publications

References 48 publications

Unless Reasoning

Unless Reasoning

The Comprehension of Counterfactual Conditionals: Evidence From Eye-Tracking in the Visual World Paradigm

Thinking About the Opposite of What Is Said: Counterfactual Conditionals and Symbolic or Alternate Simulations of Negation

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