INDIRECT CONSEQUENTIALISM, SUBOPTIMALITY, AND FRIENDSHIP¹

Abstract

Critics have persistently charged that indirect consequentialism, despite the best efforts of its defenders, ultimately fails to appropriately account for friendship in the face of the alienation generated by the harsh demands of consequentialism. Robert F. Card has recently alleged that the dispositional emphasis of indirect consequentialism renders its defender incapable of rejecting problematic friendships that are seriously suboptimal. I argue that Card's criticism not only fails to undermine indirect consequentialism, but in fact provides considerations that both help us to better understand the theory and ultimately weigh in favor of it over Card's own brand of sophisticated consequentialism. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism

“…Call such theories Levelled Consequentialisms (see e.g. Railton, 1984;Pettit and Brennan, 1986;Tännsjö, 1995;Mason, 1998;Mason, 1999;Tedesco, 2006;and Norcross, 1997). Examples of such higher-level states include commitments, values, identities, decision procedures, roles, caring profiles, character traits, and, simply, dispositions.…”

“…16 Global Consequentialism disaggregates the two, maintaining that you ought to do whatever is best and that you ought to be committed however is best, even though the two might conflict (Hare, 1981;Railton, 1984;Pettit & Brennan, 1986). Indirect Levelled Consequentialism maintains that you ought to do whatever you ought to be committed to (or disposed to, or what have you) Tedesco, 2006;Mason, 1998). 15 An interesting and concerning feature of Global Consequentialism, which has not been much remarked upon (though see Louise 2006, 82-84), is that the putatively non-ethical individuation of focal points comes to carry a great deal of ethical weight.…”

“…An option for the consequentialist at this point is to add another level. Perhaps it is not individual relationships themselves that are assessed for value maximization, but the governing structures that coordinate and support individual relationships (Mason, 1998;Tedesco, 2006). But in reply, one might modify Cocking and Oakley's objection and argue that it is alienating for a Levelled Consequentialist's friendships to be conditional upon a higher-level governing structure, which one accepts if and only if it is appropriately value promoting.…”

Duties to Make Friends

“…So let us focus on consequentialisms that assess partial practices, rather than partial acts, in terms of (2a). 10 'Partial practices' might be relationship-specific (each relationship has one practice (Cocking & Oakley 1995)), agent-specific (each agent has one practice (Mason 1998;Tedesco 2006)), or perhaps community-specific (each community has one practice). I remain agnostic on this-though it will be important for my later argument that individuals can override practices to the extent of making decisions to attempt to end, or begin, special relationships.…”