Indiscriminable shades and demonstrative concepts

Chuard, Philippe

doi:10.1080/00048400701343143

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…For some, demonstrative concepts have incoherent extension and individuation conditions (see Chuard 2007). As they exploit the presence of a quality and the possibility of a subject to identify it demonstratively, they would emerge through the direct perception of a quality that would act as a semantic value.…”

Section: Demonstrative Concepts Are a Chimaeramentioning

confidence: 99%

On perception as the basis for object concepts

Alessandroni

Rodríguez

2019

P&C

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Within cognitive and developmental psychology, it is commonly argued that perception is the basis for object concepts. According to this view, sensory experiences would translate into concepts thanks to the recognition, correlation and integration of physical attributes. Once attributes are integrated into general patterns, subjects would become able to parse objects into categories. In this article, we critically review the three epistemological perspectives according to which it can be claimed that object concepts depend on perception: state non-conceptualism, content non-conceptualism, and content conceptualism. We show that the three perspectives have problems that make perception inadequate as a conceptual basis. We suggest that the inquiry about the origin and development of object concepts can benefit from a pragmatic perspective that considers objects’ cultural functions as a conceptual foundation. We address this possibility from the theoretical framework of the pragmatics of the object, considering the importance of objects’ functional permanence.

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Section: Demonstrative Concepts Are a Chimaeramentioning

confidence: 99%

On perception as the basis for object concepts

Alessandroni

Rodríguez

2019

P&C

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“…Why think adjacent items in a putative phenomenal continuum are phenomenally different? And why, if they are phenomenally different, are they indiscriminable, as “fallibilists” (Chuard 2007) have claimed? Typically, fallibilists construe indiscriminability as an epistemic (rather than purely perceptual) failing, but the details are unclear.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua

Raffman

2012

Philosophical Perspectives

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The relation of perceptual indiscriminability is widely thought to be nontransitive: there can be a series of objects (stimuli) s 1 . . . s n in which s 1 is pairwise indiscriminable on some perceptual dimension from s 2 , and s 2 is indiscriminable from s 3 , and s 3 from s 4 , and so forth, but s n is discriminably different from s 1 . For example, Timothy Williamson writes that [t]wo stimuli whose difference is below the threshold cannot be discriminated. Since many indiscriminable differences can add up to a discriminable difference, one can have a series of stimuli each indiscriminable from its successor, of which the first member is discriminable from the last. Indiscriminability is a nontransitive relation. (Williamson 1994, 69)

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“…McDowell's demonstrative solution has come under pressure from Peacocke, 36 Heck, 37 Dokic and Pacherie, 38 and Kelly. 39 McDowell, 40 Brewer, 41 Sedivy, 42 and Chuard 43 have attempted to respond to these criticisms. What I hope to show is that the force of the fineness of grain argument has been diminished once we consider the argument for Colour and Shape Conceptualism.…”

Section: A Reply To the Argument From Fineness Of Grainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Perception Outstrip Our Concepts in Fineness of Grain?

Connolly

2011

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We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first suggested by John McDowell, but rejected by Christopher Peacocke and Richard Heck among others. 1

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Indiscriminable shades and demonstrative concepts

Cited by 5 publications

References 22 publications

On perception as the basis for object concepts

On perception as the basis for object concepts

Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua

Does Perception Outstrip Our Concepts in Fineness of Grain?

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