Individual Differences in Attention and Intelligence: A United Cognitive/Psychometric Approach

Abstract

Process overlap theory (POT) is a new theoretical framework designed to account for the general factor of intelligence (g). According to POT, g does not reflect a general cognitive ability. Instead, g is the result of multiple domain-general executive attention processes and multiple domain-specific processes that are sampled in an overlapping manner across a battery of intelligence tests. POT explains several benchmark findings on human intelligence. However, the precise nature of the executive attention processes underlying g remains unclear. In the current paper, we discuss challenges associated with building a theory of individual differences in attention and intelligence. We argue that the conflation of psychological theories and statistical models, as well as problematic inferences based on latent variables, impedes research progress and prevents theory building. Two studies designed to illustrate the unique features of POT relative to previous approaches are presented. In Study 1, a simulation is presented to illustrate precisely how POT accounts for the relationship between executive attention processes and g. In Study 2, three datasets from previous studies are reanalyzed (N = 243, N = 234, N = 945) and reveal a discrepancy between the POT simulated model and the unity/diversity model of executive function. We suggest that this discrepancy is largely due to methodological problems in previous studies but also reflects different goals of research on individual differences in attention. The unity/diversity model is designed to facilitate research on executive function and dysfunction associated with cognitive and neural development and disease. POT is uniquely suited to guide and facilitate research on individual differences in cognitive ability and the investigation of executive attention processes underlying g.

Convergence between G and g in three monkey species (Sapajus spp, Ateles geoffroyi, and Macaca fascicularis).

“…Burkart et al (2017a) have suggested that this might be a major source of species differences in cognition. Human individual differences research (Conway et al, 2021) has also found Note. In turn, individual-level g-scores are calculated with the full cognitive battery and the restricted cognitive battery.…”

The role of attention control in complex real-world tasks

“…But Engle (2002) proposed that attentional mechanisms largely account for individual differences in both working memory capacity and fluid intelligence, and therefore attentional mechanisms are the primary and causal reason for the relationship between the two constructs (see Engle, 2002;Engle et al, 1999;Heitz et al, 2005;2006; Shipstead et al, 2016;; also see Burgoyne et al, 2019;Wiley et al, 2011). Engle and colleague's executive attention view of individual differences in working memory capacity is compatible with Kovacs and Conway's (2016) recent and novel account of intelligence called process overlap theory, for example Conway et al (2021) stated, "A central claim of [process overlap theory] is that domain-general executive attention processes play a critical role in intelligence, acting as a central bottleneck on task performance and a constraint on development of domain-specific cognitive abilities" (p. 2).…”

“…In the maintenance/disengagement hypothesis, attention control is the commonality between working memory capacity and fluid intelligence and therefore the reason that these constructs (and perhaps all higher-order cognitive abilities) are related is due to their reliance on top-down executive attention (see Burgoyne & Engle, 2020; also see Conway et al, 2021 andRueda, 2018 for similar views). It should therefore be the case that, for most behaviors, attention control is a better indicator of one's overall cognitive capability than working memory capacity and/or fluid intelligence alone.…”

“…At present, the issues of measurement of attention and whether attention control is a psychometric construct are topics of debate among researchers. This is further complicated in that studies of attention control often operationalize it in terms of "inhibition", and it is not entirely clear if what is labeled as inhibition is equivalent to what we and others call attention control (i.e., jingle-jangle fallacies; Kelley, 1927, also see Conway et al, 2021 for terminology confusion in this area). On the surface, it would appear so because, (a) many of the same tasks are traditionally used to measure these abilities (such as Stroop, flanker, antisaccade; see Figure 5), (b) inhibition appears to be a common way to conceptualize broad attention control (e.g., Rey-Mermet et al, 2018;von Bastian et al, 2020), and, (c) some authors seem to use attention and inhibition interchangeably (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004).…”

“…Koster et al (2017) defined cognitive control as "executive processes that allow information processing and behavior to vary adaptively over time depending on current goals" (p. 80), similar to our definition of attention control, but they conceptualized it as involving all three of the executive functions from the Miyake et al (2000) framework (inhibition, shifting, and updating). According to Conway et al (2021), cognitive control is a "broad construct that refers to the regulation of information processing during goaldirected behavior" (p. 7), and they also classified attention control as referring to individual differences in cognitive control. In the following sections, we will refer to the broader concept of cognitive control and then narrow it down to working memory and attention mechanisms more specifically.…”