Process overlap theory (POT) is a new theoretical framework designed to account for the general factor of intelligence (g). According to POT, g does not reflect a general cognitive ability. Instead, g is the result of multiple domain-general executive attention processes and multiple domain-specific processes that are sampled in an overlapping manner across a battery of intelligence tests. POT explains several benchmark findings on human intelligence. However, the precise nature of the executive attention processes underlying g remains unclear. In the current paper, we discuss challenges associated with building a theory of individual differences in attention and intelligence. We argue that the conflation of psychological theories and statistical models, as well as problematic inferences based on latent variables, impedes research progress and prevents theory building. Two studies designed to illustrate the unique features of POT relative to previous approaches are presented. In Study 1, a simulation is presented to illustrate precisely how POT accounts for the relationship between executive attention processes and g. In Study 2, three datasets from previous studies are reanalyzed (N = 243, N = 234, N = 945) and reveal a discrepancy between the POT simulated model and the unity/diversity model of executive function. We suggest that this discrepancy is largely due to methodological problems in previous studies but also reflects different goals of research on individual differences in attention. The unity/diversity model is designed to facilitate research on executive function and dysfunction associated with cognitive and neural development and disease. POT is uniquely suited to guide and facilitate research on individual differences in cognitive ability and the investigation of executive attention processes underlying g.

In the current issue of the Journal of Intelligence, Hannon (2019) reports a novel and intriguing pattern of results that could be interpreted as evidence that the SAT is biased against Hispanic students. Specifically, Hannon’s analyses suggest that non-cognitive factors, such as test anxiety, contribute to SAT performance and the impact of test anxiety on the SAT is stronger among Hispanic students than European-American students. Importantly, this pattern of results was observed after controlling for individual differences in cognitive abilities. We argue that there are multiple issues with Hannon’s investigation and interpretation. For instance, Hannon did not include an adequate number or variety of measures of cognitive ability. In addition, the measure of test anxiety was a retrospective self-report survey on evaluated anxiety rather than a direct measure of situational test anxiety associated with the SAT. Based on these and other observations, we conclude that Hannon’s current results do not provide sufficient evidence to suggest that non-cognitive factors play a significant role in the SAT or that they impact European-American and Hispanic students differently.

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