2009
DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/88/30011
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Individual's expulsion to nasty environment promotes cooperation in public goods games

Abstract: Previous studies of games on dynamic graphs have almost specified pairwise interactions using the prisoner's dilemma game. We instead here for the first time explore coevolutionary dynamics in the context of interactions being characterized by the public goods game. Individuals are endowed with the capacity to adjust both their strategy and their social ties, occurring exclusively dependent on their payoffs. Under strategy updating, focal individuals are more likely to imitate their neighbors performing better… Show more

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Cited by 56 publications
(50 citation statements)
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References 28 publications
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“…In turn, such neighborhood adjustment is likely to affect the potential payoff from future interactions. This kind of coevolutionary dynamics as a feedback mechanism proves to favor the evolution of cooperation [38][39][40][41][42][43].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In turn, such neighborhood adjustment is likely to affect the potential payoff from future interactions. This kind of coevolutionary dynamics as a feedback mechanism proves to favor the evolution of cooperation [38][39][40][41][42][43].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…In the asynchronous strategy updating pattern, just a pair of connected individuals are chosen to update their strategies. When it comes to study the coevolutionary dynamics [38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45] of strategies and social ties, the asynchronous updating is widely used. Coevolution means that individuals are able to not only mimic their neighbors, but also adjust their social ties in response to the game outcomes.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) has become a paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation among individuals through pairwise interactions [1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]. As a natural extension, the N-person PDG, namely, the public goods game (PGG) for collective interactions also attracts much attention [10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20]. In a typical PGG, each player in a group of N individuals is entitled to adopt either cooperation (C) or defection (D).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Taking such delays into account essentially means altering the time scales of evolutionary dynamics [17][18][19]. Previous research showed that the diversity in reproduction time scales [20] [25][26][27], have also been noted as beneficial for resolving social dilemmas. The application of a delayed distribution of accumulating goods, however, cannot be considered as a simple separation of time scales between learning (strategy adoption) and interaction (payoff accumulation) processes because cooperators, as we will see, lose their payoff permanently between two consecutive distributions, while the effective payoff of defectors remains unchanged.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous research showed that the diversity in reproduction time scales [20] and the coevolution of time scales [21] both promote cooperation. Indirect ways of altering the time scales, for example, by means of breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement [22], wealth accumulation [23], consideration of long-term benefits [24], or other coevolutionary processes [25][26][27], have also been noted as beneficial for resolving social dilemmas. The application of a delayed distribution of accumulating goods, however, cannot be considered as a simple separation of time scales between learning (strategy adoption) and interaction (payoff accumulation) processes because cooperators, as we will see, lose their payoff permanently between two consecutive distributions, while the effective payoff of defectors remains unchanged.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%