Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach

Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

“…Subjects were drawn randomly from the VSEEL student subject pool and invited to participate. 17 We excluded subjects who had participated in the related repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments reported in Rosokha (2018, 2019a,b) and Cason and Mui (2019).…”

“…Related work also finds that strategy revisions become less frequent over time(Cason and Mui, 2019, across supergames; Romero and Rosokha, 2019a, within supergames; and Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2019, for non-binding strategies) Cason and Mui (2019). also find that subjects who earn more in one supergame are less likely to change strategy from that supergame to the next.…”

“…In particular, we aim to: (i) elicit initial supergame strategies and initial beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others; (ii) analyze how beliefs and behavior change with experience; and (iii) understand whether personality predicts behavior and beliefs. To achieve these aims, we build on recent work that: (i) directly elicits supergame strategies in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma after some experience of playing the game (Romero and Rosokha, 2018;Cason and Mui, 2019; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2019); 2 and (ii) studies the role of personal traits in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma without eliciting strategies or beliefs about strategies (e.g., Dreber et al, 2014, Proto et al, 2019.…”

“…Many experimental game-theoretic studies consider only initial behavior by suppressing feedback (e.g.,Costa-Gomes et al, 2001). 22 In indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games, Rosokha (2018, 2019a),Cason and Mui (2019) and Dal Bó and Fréchette (2019) elicit supergame strategies from a larger strategy space, while Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) ask subjects to choose a memory-1 rule after three rounds of the supergame.23 For simplicity, players do not respond to their own defections under our definitions of G and G2. In our setting without mistakes in implementation, our definitions of G and G2 are behaviorally equivalent to those inFudenberg et al (2012): under both definitions of G, a player never deviates until her opponent has done so; and under both definitions of G2, a player never deviates until her opponent has deviated twice in a row.…”

The Evolution of Cooperation: The Role of Costly Strategy Adjustments

“…An ongoing interaction is typically modeled as a repeated game (also referred to as a supergame), and much work has been done to understand strategies that arise across multiple repeated games (Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011;Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber 2012;Bigoni et al 2015;Dal Bó and Fréchette 2016;and Cason and Mui 2018). However, to the best of our knowledge, little work has been done to understand factors that are important within supergames.…”