Indoctrination anxiety and the etiology of belief

Abstract

People sometimes try to call others' beliefs into question by pointing out the contingent causal origins of those beliefs. The significance of such 'Etiological Challenges' is a topic that has started attracting attention in epistemology. Current work on this topic aims to show that Etiological Challenges are, at most, only indirectly epistemically significant, insofar as they bring other generic epistemic considerations to the agent's attention (e.g. disagreement, consistency with one's own epistemic standards, evidence of one's fallibility). Against this approach, we argue that Etiological Challenges are epistemically significant in a more direct and more distinctive way. An Etiological Challenge prompts the agent to assess whether her beliefs result from practices of indoctrination, and whether she should reduce confidence in those beliefs, given the anti-reliability of indoctrination as a method of belief-acquisition. Our analysis also draws attention to some of the ways in which epistemic concerns interact with political issues-e.g. relating to epistemic injustice, identity-based discrimination, and segregation-when we're thinking about the contingent causal origins of our beliefs.

Irrelevant Influences

“… For work that discusses these issues more or less directly see Anur & Scott‐Kakures (forthcoming), De Cruz (ms), DiPaolo and Simpson (), Dworkin (, ), Elga (ms), Mogensen (), Rosen (), Schechter (ms), Schoenfield (), Sher (), and White (). For similar themes in philosophy of religion see Garber (, ) and Plantinga ().…”

“…Some explicitly don't define or circumscribe the phenomenon, but rather rely on examples to give the reader an intuitive grasp (e.g., Schoenfield () and White ()). Others are either insufficiently neutral or insufficiently inclusive (e.g., Mogensen (), diPaolo and Simpson ()).…”

Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness

“…Others writing on this topic also seem to understand explanatory challenges as genealogical challenges. Yuval Avnur and Dion Scott-Kakures (2015: 7) claim irrelevant influences “pose a distinctively genealogical challenge.” The accounts in my article with Robert Mark Simpson (2016) and Katia Vavova's (2018) also look genealogical: Simpson and I link the worry to the concern that one's beliefs have their origins in a program of indoctrination, while Vavova argues the worry is about unreliable belief formation. Perhaps, then, these authors have all identified something essential.…”

Nietzsche as a Critic of Genealogical Debunking: Making Room for Naturalism without Subversion

“…8 We have in mind the debates over whether beliefs can be debunked by showing that one's acceptance of them is orthogonal to their truth. See, e.g., Srinivasan (2015), Mogensen (2016), andDiPaolo andSimpson (2016). Although space constraints prohibit elaboration, we take the argument we ascribe to Nietzsche to be directly relevant to the contemporary debate.…”

“…,Mogensen (2016), andDiPaolo and Simpson (2016).17 SeeNehamas (1985, ch. 4).P3 If values V claim authority for themselves in terms that are incompatible with their having origins O, and they in fact have origins O, then values V should be called into question.…”