Indonesian Government’s COVID-19 Measures, January–May 2020: Late Response and Public Health Securitization

Abstract

The Indonesian government’s measures to control the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic can be characterized by late response due to initial de-securitization of the issue, and later securitization that limits its very efficacy in restricting the spread of the pandemic. This article uses securitization theory to analyze the government’s measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic and discusses how the government’s increasing reliance on military figures and national security agencies influences the measures used to control the COVID-19 pandemic. This study finds that initially, the government seemed to be trying to de-securitize the issue, denying warnings that the virus might have existed undetected in Indonesia. Then, after the first cases were confirmed in March 2020, the government responded by securitizing the issue. The delay in the government’s response to COVID-19 caused the audience to not fully accept the government’s securitization efforts because public trust in the government’s measures was already low, while the means of emergency action taken by the government against the threat of COVID-19 are also limited. The government has also been overly reliant on influential military figures and national security agencies. The government also tended to downgrade the threats, lack transparency, and even use the pandemic to crack down on anti-government smears. This article concludes that the government needs to change their approach to COVID-19 measures and prioritize the human security dimension by not downgrading the threats and upholding transparency.

Assessing the Indonesian government's compliance with the public information disclosure law in the context of COVID-19 data transparency

“…Additionally, the case-tracking procedure is not made public, the statements made are inconsistent, and the rules put into place are closed (Al Farizi and Harmawan, 2020). Low public trust and low public support for the government's securitization efforts as a result of the government's tardy response to COVID-19 have also prevented the government from taking immediate action in response to the COVID-19 threat (Chairil, 2020).…”

“…Additionally, the government does not publicly conduct mass testing or case tracking procedures, nor does it disclose detailed information on the outbreak in official statements (Al Farizi and Harmawan, 2020). The lack of prompt action by the government in response to the COVID-19 danger and poor public trust make this situation worse (Chairil, 2020;Olivia et al, 2020).…”

política del miedo en la securitización de la pandemia de COVID-19

“…Aunque esta teoría ha sido ampliamente desarrollada, tal y como se desprende de la bibliografía antes citada, sorprende constatar que hasta la fecha no se ha llevado a cabo ninguna investigación que analice la relación entre este marco teórico y las ideas de thomas Hobbes acerca del miedo y la seguridad. Incluso los más recientes estudios de la pandemia de coronavirus que han asumido esta perspectiva teórica no abordan esta conexión con el pensamiento de Hobbes (kirk y McDonald, 2021;Hai, 2022;Dietrich et al, 2023;Diez, 2023;Stivas y Cole, 2023;Molnár et al, 2020;Dela Cruz et al, 2022;Chairil, 2020; kuteleva y Clifford, 2021; Pfrimer y Barbosa, 2020; Baele y Rousseau, 2022). Por este motivo el presente estudio trata de llenar esta laguna en la literatura académica al plantear un enfoque de la teoría de la securitización desde el prisma de la filosofía política de Hobbes.…”

ASEAN and Its Relevance amidst Pandemic

“…Many studies suggest that the government elites may be best positioned to shape security attitudes and use their narratives to influence public attitudes during a crisis (Karyotis et al, 2021). In his study, Chairil (2021) asserts that state response toward the pandemic may be mainly driven by security rather than public health issues. This is particularly true for several ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia.…”