Abstract

The Indonesian government’s measures to control the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic can be characterized by late response due to initial de-securitization of the issue, and later securitization that limits its very efficacy in restricting the spread of the pandemic. This article uses securitization theory to analyze the government’s measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic and discusses how the government’s increasing reliance on military figures and national security agencies influences the measures used to control the COVID-19 pandemic. This study finds that initially, the government seemed to be trying to de-securitize the issue, denying warnings that the virus might have existed undetected in Indonesia. Then, after the first cases were confirmed in March 2020, the government responded by securitizing the issue. The delay in the government’s response to COVID-19 caused the audience to not fully accept the government’s securitization efforts because public trust in the government’s measures was already low, while the means of emergency action taken by the government against the threat of COVID-19 are also limited. The government has also been overly reliant on influential military figures and national security agencies. The government also tended to downgrade the threats, lack transparency, and even use the pandemic to crack down on anti-government smears. This article concludes that the government needs to change their approach to COVID-19 measures and prioritize the human security dimension by not downgrading the threats and upholding transparency.

Abstract

While the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint 2025 envisages a centrality of regional architecture in responding to security challenges in the region, divided positions among the member states – mostly visible in the South China Sea dispute – have deepened the pessimism on the fate of APSC. Notwithstanding the persisting intra-ASEAN disunity, the organization has been projecting the goal of ASEAN centrality in the global political arena. The goal highlights ASEAN’s emerging role as the ‘hub’ of regional cooperation in Asia-Pacific hence cohesion is highly expected. This paper aims to examine ASEAN cohesion and how it aligns with the institution’s community-building project. To this aim, it primarily looks at the pattern of divergence and convergence in ASEAN voting behavior across security issues discussed in the UN General Assembly. It also underscores the underlying factors behind the emerging patterns. Using Agreement Index (AI), this paper found that ASEAN member states’ voting highly converges on colonialism, the law of the sea, the Mediterranean region, military expenditures, outer space, peace, and transnational crimes. Alternatively, voting diverges on resolutions related to arms transfer, counterterrorism, and armed conflict. Contributing factors to this pattern include member states' preferences, the identity, value, norms, and cognitive prior of the regional organization, as well as alliance and major powers’ preferences.

As an archipelagic country, Indonesia has long envisioned developing its Navy (TNI AL) to become a world-class sea power. After its development was ruled out for a long period, the Minimum Essential Force published in 2010 mandates significant improvement in the Navy's strength. The doctrine of Global Maritime Fulcrum announced in 2014 also rests on maritime defense as one of its pillars, mandating the development of the Navy�s capability. Despite the grand vision, it is unclear to what extent the Navy has been developed to achieve this aim. This paper aims to answer this question by establishing a Maritime Power Competitiveness Index as a composite index for measuring the sea power of countries. Using the index, this paper then measures the Indonesian Navy's strength through the years to track the development of its capability and compares it with the navies of other rival countries.