Infant Communication: A Problem for Relevance Theory?

Abstract

In this article I clarify an argument by Richard Breheny against Relevance Theory based on a problem posed by infant communication. I present Sperber and Wilson's solution and argue that Breheny's objection to it does not hold. I argue that Breheny's alternative notion of communication does not meet the requirement of the overtness of communication. If one drops this requirement, then the way is open for a theoretically simpler notion of communication.

Twelve‐month‐olds’ comprehension and production of pointing

“…To explore the roots of our understanding of communicative pointing gestures, infants’ ability needs to be assessed using a task such as the hiding‐finding game (see Pfister, 2010: 17). Since infants already begin pointing for others at around 12 months, one interesting question is whether, beyond simple point following, infants this age already comprehend the communicative/informative function of pointing.…”

“…1 1 Please see Breheny (2006) , Csibra (2010) , Pfister (2010) , and Tomasello (2008) for more detailed descriptions and in‐depth discussions of how best to characterize young children's communicative understanding and of how these more minimal accounts of children's understanding relate to linguistic theories of adult intentional communication, in particular Gricean communicative intentions and relevance theory. …”