No abstract

No abstract

Paul Grice distinguishes between natural meaning and non-natural meaning, where the first notion is especially connected to something’s being a natural sign and the second to communication. It is argued that some of the arguments against the distinction being exhaustive are based on a misinterpretation of Grice, but also that the distinction cannot be exhaustive if one takes into account both the criterion of factivity and the connection to communication. If one makes a distinction between natural and non-natural communication, then there are different types of natural communication to be distinguished: goal-directed communication, intentional communication and open intentional communication. Given the empirical evidence, the behavior of chimpanzees and of human infants may be described as goal-directed communication, but there are also important differences between the communicative behavior of the two.

In this article I clarify an argument by Richard Breheny against Relevance Theory based on a problem posed by infant communication. I present Sperber and Wilson's solution and argue that Breheny's objection to it does not hold. I argue that Breheny's alternative notion of communication does not meet the requirement of the overtness of communication. If one drops this requirement, then the way is open for a theoretically simpler notion of communication.

No abstract