Informal Institutional Responses to Government Interventions: Lessons from Madhupur National Park, Bangladesh

Abstract

Madhupur National Park is renowned for severe resource ownership conflicts between ethnic communities and government authorities in Bangladesh. In this study, we applied the Institutional Analysis and Development framework to identify: (i) past and present informal institutional structures within the ethnic Garo community for land resource management; (ii) the origin of the land ownership dispute; (iii) interaction mechanisms between formal and informal institutions; and (iv) change in land management authority and informal governance structures. We identify that the informal institutions of the traditional community have undergone radical change due to government interventions with implications for the regulation of land use, informal institutional functions, and joint-decision-making. Importantly, the government's persistent denial of the role of existing informal institutions is widening the gap between government and community actors, and driving land ownership conflicts in a cyclic way with associated natural resource degradation.

Traditional Institution for Forest Conservation within a Changing Community: Insight from the Case of Upland South Sumatra

“…Results of this study complements previous knowledge about the interaction of formal and informal institutions in the context of forest management (see Mowo et al 2013;Rahman et al 2014;Osei-Tutu et al 2015). Informal institution of natural forest UNNES JOURNALS conservation worked effectively in the past because users are socially recognized as an authority to enforce the rules and in situations where land is still widely available.…”

Addressing food and nutrition insecurity in the Caribbean through domestic smallholder farming system innovation

“…Rahman et al (2014) described this phenomenon of dual resource management systems with conflicting objectives as resulting in an ''inter-institutional pitfall'' which undermines reciprocity, knowledge exchange, learning, and development of common interests across institutions. Policy can bridge these gaps, foster trust, and shared vision by acknowledging informal institutions and enhancing cooperation through inter-institutional processes (such as multi-stakeholder groups) supported by mediating agents (Rahman et al 2014).…”

A framework for analyzing institutional gaps in natural resource governance

“…In MNP, there are tensions in land resource ownership between the Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD) and the local communities, and in particular the ethnic Garo community. Historically, the Garo community inhabited the park and they still claim themselves as the rightful owners of the land, although this is not acknowledged by the government (Rahman et al 2014). As a result, the community uses their long-standing informal social customs and constitutional choice rules to govern access to land resources (e.g.…”

“…Indeed, forest officials do not recognize Garo customary rules for land resource management; subsequently they are not familiar with their cultural and social practices (e.g. matriarchal land hereditary rules; land conversion and cultivation techniques) (Rahman et al 2014). The concept of legal pluralism addresses the tension between the formal government and the ethnic Garo institutions by identifying inter-institutional gaps between the formal and informal constitutional choice rules.…”

“…Inter-institutional conflict results because the formal constitutional choice rules of the BFD and the customary rules of the Garo community do not adequately recognize each another. There is also a cultural mismatch between the community's customary rules for land resource management and the day-to-day operational choice rules used by the forest officials to make decisions (Rahman et al 2014). This situation is made more complex by the recent emergence of new leaders in Garo society (Krishna 2011).…”