Information acquisition during a descending auction

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim

doi:10.1007/s00199-013-0766-y

Cited by 4 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Papers that study information acquisition during an auction are by Compte and Jehiel [3], Rezende [15], Gretschko and Wambach [5] and Miettinen [12].…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Like Compte and Jehiel he also finds that the English auction is superior to the second price auction. Wambach and Gretschko [5] and Miettinen [12] study information acquisition during a descending price auction in a symmetric setting with private values. Wambach and Gretschko assume that the players observe a noisy signal about their valuation and can learn their accurate valuation by incurring a cost that is private information for the players.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Information Acquisition During a Descending Price Auction with Asymmetrically Informed Players

Miettinen¹

2017

SSRN Journal

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This paper considers equilibrium behavior in a descending price auction with two players that are asymmetrically informed. The "informed" player knows his valuation while the other does not. The uninformed player can acquire information about his valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert and we characterize the equilibrium behavior in the setting where players' valuations are independently and identically distributed. We derive the explicit "inverse bid" functions in the case of the uniformly distributed valuations and provide a revenue comparison between the ascending and descending price auctions in this case.

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“…Papers that study information acquisition during an auction are by Compte and Jehiel [3], Rezende [15], Gretschko and Wambach [5] and Miettinen [12].…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Information Acquisition During a Descending Price Auction with Asymmetrically Informed Players

Miettinen¹

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…Finally, subsequent work by Gretschko and Wambach (2014) and Miettinen (2013) study mid-auction information acquisition in Dutch auctions. Gretschko and Wambach (2014) investigate Dutch auctions in the same setting that is considered here and employ the analytical tools I propose in this paper to characterize and prove the existence of an equilibrium and obtain a revenue ranking: They show that if the cost of information acquisition is low, the descending price auction generates less revenue than the first-price auction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Gretschko and Wambach (2014) investigate Dutch auctions in the same setting that is considered here and employ the analytical tools I propose in this paper to characterize and prove the existence of an equilibrium and obtain a revenue ranking: They show that if the cost of information acquisition is low, the descending price auction generates less revenue than the first-price auction. Their work is complementary to this paper: Taken together, the papers establish a theory of mid-auction information acquisition in all four classical auction formats under the same setting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Mid-auction information acquisition

Rezende

2017

Econ Theory

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An English auction is studied in which bidders can acquire information during the bidding process, allowing for heterogeneity both in ex-ante private information and the cost of information acquisition. The best response has a simple characterization where the optimal information acquisition time is unaffected by the other bidders' strategies. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in a novel way by characterizing it as a fixed point in the space of bid distributions rather than the space of bid functions. Furthermore, we show that when bidders have homogeneous ex-ante private information about valuations: (1) The English auction generates more revenue than the Vickrey auction when the number of bidders is sufficiently large; and (2) the English auction is more efficient than the Vickrey auction when the information acquisition cost are relatively small. We present numerical simulations that show that these effects can be large. Our findings provide an additional explanation for the popularity of the English auction, even in settings where the bidders' valuations are independent.

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“…While bids disclosed in real-time influence bidding behavior (Arora et al 2007;Brocas et al 2015;Cason et al 2011;Flanagin 2007;Gretschko and Rajko 2014;Gretschko and Wambach 2014;Kannan 2012;Miettinen 2013;Soh et al 2006), their impact on regret in open-bid auctions has yet to be analyzed. Examining such behaviors in open-bid auctions is important in order to obtain a more holistic understanding of regret in online auctions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regret under different auction designs: the case of English and Dutch auctions

et al. 2019

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Studies have shown that users experience regret in online electronic auctions. Our study adds to the research on the antecedents of regret by examining the effects of the major types of auction design on users' experience of regret. Towards this goal, we analyzed bidders' experience of regret in English and Dutch auctions. Given that English and Dutch auctions are known to produce different types of bidding behavior and outcomes, we expect that the two types of auction design will also have a differential impact on experiencing regret. We report results from a lab experiment that was implemented as a self-developed mobile application for hotel room reservations. We examined the effects of the two open-bid auction types on the experience of regret, and found that users are more likely to experience regret in Dutch auctions. We point out the theoretical relevance and practical implications of our findings.

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Information acquisition during a descending auction

Cited by 4 publications

References 12 publications

Information Acquisition During a Descending Price Auction with Asymmetrically Informed Players

Information Acquisition During a Descending Price Auction with Asymmetrically Informed Players

Mid-auction information acquisition

Regret under different auction designs: the case of English and Dutch auctions

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