Information Goods vs. Industrial Goods: Cost Structure and Competition

Jones, Roy; Mendelson, Haim

doi:10.1287/mnsc.1100.1262

Cited by 134 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…For the emission reduction, it is relatively easy to carry out in small reduction amount with low cost and much higher cost as reduction goes up [44]. Thus, the reduction cost ( …”

Section: Decision Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Zhao

Lei

2015

Sustainability

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Abstract:We study an emission-dependent dyadic fashion supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their own component/product emissions to serve the carbon-footprint sensitive consumers. With Carbon Tax regulation, we consider four scenarios resulting from two ways in form of adopting transfer price contract and/or introducing third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS) to enhance the efficiency of systematic emission reductions. We refine four models from these corresponding scenarios, which in turn constitute a decision-making framework composed of determining vertical incentives and choosing supply chain structures. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we compare their emission reduction efficiencies and profitability for each pair of settings. Theoretic analysis and numerical studies show that adopting vertical transfer payment schemes can definitely benefit channel carbon footprint reduction and Pareto improvement of supply chain profitability, regardless of whether the emissionreduction service exists or not. However, whether introducing TPERS or not is heavily depending on systematic parameters when the transfer payment incentive is adopted there. We also provide insights on the sensitivity of carbon tax parameters with respect to the supply chain performance, overall carbon emission reduction, vertical incentive and TPERS adopting decision-makings. OPEN ACCESSSustainability 2015, 7 4281

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“…For the emission reduction, it is relatively easy to carry out in small reduction amount with low cost and much higher cost as reduction goes up [44]. Thus, the reduction cost ( …”

Section: Decision Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Zhao

Lei

2015

Sustainability

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“…There is a rich stream of literature on these topics, examining how the versioning decision relates to cost-to-quality ratios, consumer heterogeneity, positive network effects, competition, asymmetric information, group tastes, and free disposal concerns (see, e.g., Bhargava and Choudhary 2001, Johnson and Myatt 2003, Jing 2007, Jones and Mendelson 2011, Wei and Nault 2011, Chellappa and Jia 2011, Chellappa and Mehra 2013, Niculescu and Wu 2014.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cloud Implications on Software Network Structure and Security Risks

August

Niculescu

Shin

2014

Information Systems Research

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By software vendors offering, via the cloud, software-as-a-service (SaaS) versions of traditionally on-premises application software, security risks associated with usage become more diversified. This can greatly increase the value associated with the software. In an environment where negative security externalities are present and users make complex consumption and patching decisions, we construct a model that clarifies whether and how SaaS versions should be offered by vendors. We find that the existence of version-specific security externalities is sufficient to warrant a versioned outcome, which has been shown to be suboptimal in the absence of security risks. In high security-loss environments, we find that SaaS should be geared to the middle tier of the consumer market if patching costs and the quality of the SaaS offering are high, and geared to the lower tier otherwise. In the former case, when security risk associated with each version is endogenously determined by consumption choices, strategic interactions between the vendor and consumers may cause a higher tier consumer segment to prefer a lower inherent quality product. Relative to on-premises benchmarks, we find that software diversification leads to lower average security losses for users when patching costs are high. However, when patching costs are low, surprisingly, average security losses can increase as a result of SaaS offerings and lead to lower consumer surplus. We also investigate the vendor’s security investment decision and establish that, as the market becomes riskier, the vendor tends to increase investments in an on-premises version and decrease investments in a SaaS version. On the other hand, in low security-loss environments, we find that SaaS is optimally targeted to a lower tier of the consumer market, average security losses decrease, and consumer surplus increases as a result. Security investments increase for both software versions as risk increases in these environments.

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“…Various GNSS processing techniques deliver different levels of positioning accuracy and service coverage. The actual product that is delivered to consumers through a positioning service is a data 'correction', which exhibits characteristics of an 'information good' (see Section 3) in the economic literature (Arrow 1959;Shapiro & Varian 1999;Jones & Mendelson 2011).…”

Section: Evolution Of Cors Network In Australiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Descriptions of information as a commodity can be traced back to Arrow (1959), and more recently Bates (1990) and Shapiro and Varian (1999) with regard to the broader public benefits that information goods can enable. Modern examples of information goods identified by Jones and Mendelson (2011) include digital products such as computer software (e.g. operating systems, programming tools, games) and online services ranging from internet search engines and portals (e.g.…”

Section: G Hausler and P Colliermentioning

confidence: 99%