Information leakage from logically equivalent frames

Sher, Shlomi; McKenzie, Craig R. M.

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2005.11.001

Cited by 315 publications

(179 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The modeler component of Experiment 1 tests the prediction that participants will also draw large inferences from small experimental option-samples. This prediction is motivated by prior findings that participants draw robust inferences from subtle features of the experimental environment, such as the framing of options (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003;Sher & McKenzie, 2006) and the wording of questions (Schwarz, 1999) in choice experiments and opinion surveys. It is also compatible with research in social psychology which depicts the participant as an avid information scavenger, drawing far-reaching inferences from fragmentary stimuli (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993) and subtle pragmatic cues (Hilton, 1995).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Options as information: Rational reversals of evaluation and preference.

Sher¹,

McKenzie²

2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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This article develops a rational analysis of an important class of apparent preference reversals-jointseparate reversals traditionally explained by the evaluability hypothesis. The "options-as-information" model considers a hypothetical rational actor with limited knowledge about the market distribution of a stimulus attribute. The actor's evaluations are formed via a 2-stage process-an inferential stage in which beliefs are updated on the basis of the sample of options received, followed by an assessment stage in which options are evaluated in light of these updated beliefs. This process generates joint-separate reversals in standard experimental designs. The normative model explains why the evaluability hypothesis works when it does, identifies boundary conditions for the hypothesis, and clarifies some common misconceptions about these effects. In particular, it implies that joint-separate reversals are not irrational; in fact, they are not preference reversals. However, in expanded designs where more than 2 options are jointly evaluated, the model predicts that genuine (and rational) preference reversals will sometimes emerge. Results of 3 experiments suggest an excellent fit between the rational actor model and the judgments of human actors in joint-separate experiments.Keywords: context effect, evaluability hypothesis, preference reversal, rationality Procedure invariance is viewed as a basic requirement of rational choice. This principle states that different methods of eliciting preferences from a decision maker (DM) should yield the same ordering of options. However, several apparent violations of procedure invariance have been documented (reviewed in Hsee, Zhang, & Chen, 2004). This article focuses on one influential class of apparent preference reversals-joint-separate reversals (JSRs) traditionally attributed to the evaluability hypothesis (Hsee, 1996;Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). These effects are often taken to exemplify the divergence between normative and descriptive models of decision making (Hsee et al., 2004;MacLean, 2002;Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2004).In this article, we develop a normative "options-as-information" model of these JSRs. The model considers a hypothetical rational actor in a joint-separate experiment. The actor is rational but not omniscient. His or her beliefs are updated as new options are sampled, and evaluations are updated in light of these inferences. The model implies that JSRs are not preference reversals and are not counter-normative. Instead, when the dynamically evolving belief states of the DM are accounted for, typical JSRs are seen to exemplify the convergence of normative and descriptive analysis, and to illustrate how these levels of analysis can be mutually illuminating (Anderson, 1991;Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2010;McKenzie, 2003McKenzie, , 2005Oaksford & Chater, 1994). Joint-Separate ReversalsIn a paradigm developed by Hsee and colleagues (Hsee, 1996(Hsee, , 1998(Hsee, , 2000Hsee et al., 1999), two options are defined on two criti...

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Options as information: Rational reversals of evaluation and preference.

Sher¹,

McKenzie²

2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Self Cite

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“…And if they are not equivalent, there is no normative problem with them being treated differently. Sher and McKenzie (2006) reported a series of experiments testing this 'reference point' hypothesis. They predicted that when describing a fixed state (e.g., a glass of water) of proportionate affairs between state A (full) and state B (empty), speakers would be more likely to describe the proportion in terms of A when A had increased relative to some norm or reference point than when it had decreased relative to the reference point.…”

Section: Logical Vs Informational Equivalencementioning

confidence: 93%

Message Framing, Normative Advocacy and Persuasive Success

Corner

Hahn

2009

Argumentation

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In a recent article in Argumentation, O'Keefe (Argumentation 21:151-163, 2007) observed that the well-known 'framing effects' in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (''if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy'') differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (''if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy''), despite containing 'equivalent' content. This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly (and unsuspectingly) influenced by mere presentational differences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms, however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent-and hence, whether there is any normative requirement for them to be equally persuasive-is a difficult task. Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed.

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“…For example, the associative hypothesis states that framing induces a negative, or positive, focus that flows over to the selection and interpretation of information (Levin et al, 1998). In contrast the reference point hypothesis states that the frame chosen by the communicator conveys implicit information (Sher & McKenzie, 2006). This information is used in decisions but does not guide information search behaviour.…”

Section: Research Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tracing Decision Processes in Complex, Ambiguous, Information-rich Environments

Weeks

Wastell²,

Taylor³

et al. 2012

IJPS

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In order to understand analytic processes in organisations, better tools are required to trace decision processes. An impediment to progress in this area has been the tendency to over-simplify inherently complex information environments or the data that they produce. We address this issue by providing worked examples from the Analysis Simulation Project (ASP). ASP methodology consists of a computer-administered information grid of 64 cells of 50-130 words each. The information accessing activity of participants is recorded. Our results present novel approaches to maintaining optimal complexity in environmental representation and data analysis. Specifically we demonstrate how computer-mediated process tracing methods can simulate the cognitive experience of complexity and how the data can be used to examine behaviour at increasing levels of complexity. We conclude that computer-mediated process-tracing tools provide an opportunity to comprehensively model www.ccsenet.org/ijps International Journal of Psychological Studies Vol. 4, No. 1; March 2012 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education 159 complex information processing behaviour and therefore allow improved insight into phenomena with similar outcomes but distinct processes.

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Information leakage from logically equivalent frames

Cited by 315 publications

References 37 publications

Options as information: Rational reversals of evaluation and preference.

Options as information: Rational reversals of evaluation and preference.

Message Framing, Normative Advocacy and Persuasive Success

Tracing Decision Processes in Complex, Ambiguous, Information-rich Environments

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