Informing the Electorate? How Party Cues and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion about Initiatives

Boudreau, Cheryl; MacKenzie, Scott A.

doi:10.1111/ajps.12054

Cited by 248 publications

(162 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…That partisanship exerts a powerful influence on preference formation is well documented (Bartels 2002;Cambell et al 1960;Goren 2002;Jerit and Barabas 2012), and with few exceptions (Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014;Bullock 2011), research suggests that the citizenry follow elite party endorsements even at the expense of relevant information (Cohen 2003;Lau and Redlawsk 2001;Rahn 1993). This paper shows that the influence of partisanship in opinion formation is not unbounded.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 55%

“…This is a notable gap given that it strikes at the heart of opinion formation-to what extent do people rely on partisanship and issue attitudes in decision-making? The answer has important implications for our understanding of elite influence, the scope and source of distortions in preference formation, and is central to contemporary debates about the relative influence of partisanship and issue information in decision-making (Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014;Bullock 2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance

Mullinix

2015

Polit Behav

108

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An enduring and increasingly acute concern-in an age of polarized parties-is that people's partisan attachments distort preference formation at the expense of relevant information. For example, research suggests that a Democrat may support a policy proposed by Democrats, but oppose the same policy if proposed by Republicans. However, a related body of literature suggests that how people respond to information and form preferences is distorted by their prior issue attitudes. In neither instance is information even-handedly evaluated, rather, it is interpreted in light of partisanship or existing issue opinions. Both effects are well documented in isolation, but in most political scenarios individuals consider both partisanship and prior opinions-yet, these dynamics may or may not pull toward the same preference. Using nationally representative experiments focused on tax and education policies, I introduce and test a theory that isolates when: partisanship dominates preference formation, partisanship and issue opinions reinforce or offset each other, and issue attitudes trump partisanship. The findings make clear that the public does not blindly follow party elites. Depending on elite positions, the level of partisan polarization, and personal importance of issues, the public can be attentive to information and shirk the influence of party elites. The results have broad implications for political parties and citizen competence in contemporary democratic politics.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 55%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance

Mullinix

2015

Polit Behav

108

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“…Recent studies in the U.S. show that a voter's partisan biases affect their willingness to internalize new information (e.g. Jerit and Barabas 2012; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014;Bullock 2011;Gerber and Huber 2010), while European studies have indicated that poorly informed voters are most sensitive to new information (e.g. Duch 2001).…”

Section: Voter Sophisticationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Credible Sources and Sophisticated Voters: When Does New Information Induce Economic Voting?

Alt¹,

Marshall²,

Lassen³

2016

The Journal of Politics

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When does new economic information cause voters to re-evaluate the government's competence, and ultimately vote economically? Since politically-relevant information is often conveyed by actors with incentives to influence voter perceptions, the credibility of information sources can vary significantly. This article randomly varies whether voters receive an aggregate unemployment forecast from the central bank, government or main opposition party using a survey experiment in Denmark with access to detailed panel data. We find that politically sophisticated voters discern differences in institutional credibility and the political cost of the signal, and update their unemployment expectations accordingly. Despite failing to differentiate political costs, unsophisticated voters still substantially update their expectations. However, while sophisticated voters intend to engage in substantial prospective economic voting, unsophisticated voters do not link their new unemployment expectations to their vote intention. These findings suggest that economic information supports economic voting most when it is credible and reaches sophisticated voters.

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“…Do you prefer Mar over Lee or Lee over Mar?'' Previous research testifies to the importance of signals from political parties in shaping voters' choices (Popkin 1991;Sniderman and Bullock 2004;Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014). There is also considerable evidence that they facilitate spatial voting in national politics (Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Informing Electorates via Election Law: An Experimental Study of Partisan Endorsements and Nonpartisan Voter Guides in Local Elections

BoudreauCheryl¹,

ElmendorfChristopher²,

MacKenzieScott³

2015

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy

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Many legal scholars and political practitioners advocate using election law to increase voters' access to political information, either by providing such information directly on ballots or in ballot pamphlets. To date, however, little empirical evidence exists to guide policymakers and judges charged with weighing the benefits of such legal interventions against any costs they might impose. We address this gap by conducting survey experiments to examine three types of political information that legal interventions can make available or withhold: political party endorsements, endorsements from prominent public officials, and a nonpartisan voter guide describing candidates' policy positions. Our results provide evidence that such legal interventions can yield tangible benefits-namely, helping voters choose candidates whose policy views are similar to their own.

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Informing the Electorate? How Party Cues and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion about Initiatives

Cited by 248 publications

References 32 publications

Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance

Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance

Credible Sources and Sophisticated Voters: When Does New Information Induce Economic Voting?

Informing Electorates via Election Law: An Experimental Study of Partisan Endorsements and Nonpartisan Voter Guides in Local Elections

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