Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

Kohler, Philippe; Moore, Michael O.

doi:10.2307/1061510

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Examples of papers that examine various aspects of AD agency learning includeKohler and Moore (2001) andBloingen (2003).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Working the system: Firm learning and the antidumping process

Blonigen

2006

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper takes the first systematic look at how prior experience by US firms in filing US AD petitions affects future AD filing activity and outcomes. Such prior experience may affect both the cost of filing petitions, as well as the likelihood of successful outcomes and dumping margin magnitudes. Statistical analysis of data on US AD cases finds that prior AD experience leads to greater filing activity and likelihood of affirmative decisions or suspension agreements, but significantly lower dumping margins. The latter result suggests that experience does not affect dumping margins as much as it lowers filing costs, leading to petitioning of weaker cases.

show abstract

“…Examples of papers that examine various aspects of AD agency learning includeKohler and Moore (2001) andBloingen (2003).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Working the system: Firm learning and the antidumping process

Blonigen

2006

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The topic of antidumping under asymmetric information is not completely novel to the literature. also model auditing during an antidumping investigation, but they assume perfect competition, and the asymmetric information in their article is about domestic cost and whether or not material injury has occurred. In their context, the domestic government is not interested in active trade policy per se but has to employ a tariff in case the domestic industry is truly injured by foreign competition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information

Matschke

Schöttner

2013

Southern Economic Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost-based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfaremaximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: F13, F16

show abstract

“…We first assume that the authority sets an unchanging level of compliance cost. We then analyze the outcome when the authority chooses the compliance cost strategically but is indifferent to the impact of 9 Kohler and Moore (2001) use an incentive mechanism framework to show how a domestic authority can elicit truthful information from domestic firms about their actual level of injury in antidumping petitions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“Facts available” dumping allegations: when will foreign firms cooperate in antidumping petitions?

Moore

2005

European Journal of Political Economy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Foreign firms accused of dumping in the WTO system may face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with domestic investigative authorities. These punitive tariffs are typically based on the allegations of domestic firms filing the antidumping petition-so-called "facts available" dumping margins. This paper analyzes a game between two Bertrand Nash competitors: a) domestic petitioner and b) a foreign respondent, as well as an administering authority. Foreign firm cooperation will depend on the interplay between compliance costs and the allegations of the domestic competitor. The final tariff and degree of cooperation will depend on the level of compliance costs chosen by the domestic authority.JEL classification: F13, K23

show abstract

Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

Cited by 5 publications

References 19 publications

Working the system: Firm learning and the antidumping process

Working the system: Firm learning and the antidumping process

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information

“Facts available” dumping allegations: when will foreign firms cooperate in antidumping petitions?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About