Innovation Inhibitors in War: Overcoming Obstacles in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness

Jungdahl, Adam; Macdonald, Julia

doi:10.1080/01402390.2014.917628

Cited by 14 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…18. Traditional hierarchical structure: Jungdahl and Macdonald (2015). Open Innovation: Mortara and Minshall (2011).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The European defense market: Disruptive innovation and market destabilization

Bellais¹,

Fiott²

2017

EPSJ

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The global defense industry is shifting toward a new paradigm in which an emphasis on technology-driven capability development is being undermined by disruptive innovations emanating from the commercial sector. This evolution is likely to result in important effects on the defense market, lessening barriers to entry and turning upside down the approach to innovation. For the defense sector this entails that shifts in the organizational behavior of firms and military establishments are required if the full benefits of innovation are to be captured and integrated into defense capability development processes. This article analyses this shifting paradigm with the European defense market as a departure point. Briefly exploring the shifts in defense industrial processes since the 20th century, this article outlines the benefits of integrating the defense and civilian technological and industrial bases.

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“…18. Traditional hierarchical structure: Jungdahl and Macdonald (2015). Open Innovation: Mortara and Minshall (2011).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The European defense market: Disruptive innovation and market destabilization

Bellais¹,

Fiott²

2017

EPSJ

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“…This reorientation required a period of bottom-up experimentation in operating in urban settings, interacting with civilian populations, understanding local social and political environments, and fending off irregular adversaries. 45 During this time, researchers were rediscovering and refashioning COIN literature from the 1950s and 1960s into an influential new framework. 46 Bottom-up learning became particularly salient to counterinsurgency capability, as low-to middle-ranking officers improvised responses on the ground.…”

Section: Incubation: Bottom-up Experimentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…48 McMaster's 44 Ucko The new counterinsurgency era, 1-2. 45 Ibid, 4 46 Jon R. Lindsay. "Reinventing the revolution: Technological visions, counterinsurgent criticism, and the rise of special operations.…”

Section: Incubation: Bottom-up Experimentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is a military innovation and why it matters

Horowitz

Pindyck

2022

Journal of Strategic Studies

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Levée en mass is standardized and nationalized compulsory military service. While popularly described as "invented" by a 1793 French law, there was a gap between the ideological claims of the 1793 levée en mass and reality. Making conscription work would require the reorientation of French industry, a strategy for dealing with desertion, and the establishment of new promotion patterns. The provision for a system of annual recruitment did not really come until the Jourdan law of 1798, when implementation of levée en mass occurred with a true institutional framework for the yearly replenishment of the ranks of the French Army. While this framework was not without its challenges, its bureaucratization under Napoleon Bonaparte provided the steady flow of manpower needed for his grand empire. 1 No single stage in this innovation process alone sufficiently captures the extent of change required for the ultimate integration and diffusion of compulsory service. Moreover, while the levée framework would serve as a model that would then diffuse across Europe, and the wider world, it would not always produce successful results.

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“…This omission in the literature is somewhat surprising given the hugely influential role that leaders play in shaping the means by which wars are fought and the implications of those decisions for the future trajectory of conflict. For example, President Lincoln’s preference for breech loading and repeating rifles during the US Civil War against advice from his Chief of Ordnance eventually led to important improvements in the Union Army’s military effectiveness (Bruce 1956; Hallahan 1994; see also Jungdahl and Macdonald 2015). More recently, President George H. W. Bush’s decision to call up reserves early in the Gulf War crisis, to deploy troops with dispatch, and to employ massive and continuous airpower against the Iraqi forces proved decisive during the Persian Gulf War.…”

Section: Theories Of Risk Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions

Macdonald

Schneider

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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In this article, we explore how presidential risk orientations affect force employment decisions through an analysis of the use of unmanned weaponry during the Bush and Obama administrations. We hypothesize that the conception of risk plays an integral part in this choice of weaponry. In order to examine our hypothesis, we utilize the verbs-in-context system of operational code analysis to quantify the risk propensities of President Bush and President Obama during the Afghanistan War from 2001 to 2013. At the aggregate level, we find that the two presidents exhibit unique interpretations of risk with respect to manned versus unmanned weaponry. We further disaggregate our data to examine whether these preferences are fixed or fluctuate with situational changes. We find that President Bush’s risk calculations are influenced by a number of situational variables, highlighting the importance of changing decision contexts in explaining risk behaviors. President Obama’s risk calculations, on the other hand, remain constant over time lending credence to the importance of overall risk propensity in determining risk-taking behaviors. Our findings indicate that risk is an important variable in explaining the means of force employed during conflict, and that the source of this behavior can vary by leader.

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Innovation Inhibitors in War: Overcoming Obstacles in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness

Cited by 14 publications

References 26 publications

The European defense market: Disruptive innovation and market destabilization

The European defense market: Disruptive innovation and market destabilization

What is a military innovation and why it matters

Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions

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