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What accounts for the variation in the influence of scientists in the policy‐making process? Why is it that scientists sometimes appear to exercise significant autonomy in shaping policy agendas, while at other times very little? Scientists are most influential, this paper contends, when they can leverage their recognized expertise by strategically co‐opting institutionalized channels of advice. This is most likely to occur in issue areas of high complexity and ambiguity when key policy makers are dependent upon scientists for their counsel. Policy entrepreneurs within competing scientific communities, prevented from accessing key decision makers, wait until windows of opportunity open to undermine the credibility of the incumbent experts, gain access to political leaders, and refocus the policy agenda. This theory is developed and tested through a case‐study analysis of the nuclear test‐ban debate during the Eisenhower administration from 1954 to 1958. The findings of this paper underscore the need to treat foreign policy decision making as a series of strategic interactions between multiple actors with a broader capacity to influence the policy‐making process than traditionally conceived. By doing so, scholars can better understand variations in government decision making across time and issue area, providing important insights into the role of experts in a wide range of public policy domains.

By introducing a novel risk to human interaction, COVID-19 may have galvanized interest in uses of artificial intelligence (AI). But was the pandemic a large enough catalyst to change public attitudes about the costs and benefits of autonomous systems whose operations increasingly rely on AI? To answer this question, we use a preregistered research design that exploits variation across the 2018 and 2020 waves of the CCES/CES, a nationally representative survey of adults in the United States. We compare support for autonomous cars, autonomous surgeries, weapons, and cyber defense pre- and post-the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that, despite the incentives created by COVID-19, the pandemic did not increase support for most of these technologies, except in the case of autonomous surgery among those who know someone who died of COVID-19. The results hold even when controlling for a variety of relevant political and demographic factors. The pandemic did little to push potential autonomous vehicle users to support adoption. Further, American concerns about autonomous weapons, including cyber defense, remain sticky and perhaps exacerbated over the last two years. These findings suggest that the relationship between the COVID-19 pandemic and the adoption of many of these systems is far more nuanced and complex than headlines may suggest.

How do we account for the dearth of female contributions to UN peace operations (UNPOs)? For answers, this study examines conditions that led the United Nations to move to reduce the gender imbalance in UNPO personnel and provides descriptive evidence that points to the continuing underrepresentation of women in these operations. To interpret this evidence, the study presents theoretical explanations for the varying contributions of personnel to UNPOs—including the political and socioeconomic character of the contributing states, international reputations and norms, and various demand-side influences exerted by missions—and then tests these explanations with a cross-sectional time-series model that accounts for female personnel contributions to each mission in the 2010–2011 period. Although offering significant support for domestic political explanations, the findings indicate that gender diversity is not a primary goal of most contributors and is largely a by-product of force sizes.

What explains the pace at which militaries adopt new technology? We argue that the hierarchical structure and unique expertise requirements of military organizations combine to empower select individuals as 'gatekeepers' of innovation. These individuals acquire beliefs throughout their military careers regarding the nature and means of warfare that act to shape their attitudes towards new military innovations. By filtering, sidelining, and ignoring competing sources of advice and information, these officers actively inhibit the adoption of new, often advantageous, innovations. We develop this argument through the analysis of two cases: the delayed acquisition of breech-loading and repeating rifles by the Union Army during the American Civil War, and the failure of the US Army to adopt an adequate heavy-type tank in World War II.