Are violators of international human rights norms punished with lower levels of foreign aid? Despite their abstract preferences, governments often lack the incentive to punish norm violators bilaterally. Multilateral lending institutions, such as the World Bank, could fill the void if they wanted to consider human rights abuses and could bypass restrictions on evaluating the political character of recipients. This article argues that `shaming' in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, through resolutions that explicitly criticized governments for their human rights records, provided substantive information about rights abuses and gave political cover for the World Bank and other liberal multilateral aid institutions seeking to sanction human rights violators. Statistical analyses support these theoretical claims. The adoption of a UNCHR resolution condemning a country's human rights record produced a sizeable reduction in multilateral, and especially World Bank, aid but had no effect on the country's aggregate bilateral aid receipts. The analyses also support predictions that `objective' measures of human rights have no independent effect on multilateral aid allocations. The findings, which are robust to different model techniques and specifications, suggest that punishment for violating international human rights norms is selective, that international organizations play an important role in the selection process and, thus, that seemingly symbolic resolutions of a politically motivated IO can carry tangible consequences.

Although the United Nations Commission on Human Rights served as the primary forum in which governments publicly named and shamed others for abusing their citizens, the practices of the commission have been largely ignored by political scientists. To address that deficiency, this study analyzes the actions of the commission and its members' voting records in the 1977–2001 period. It establishes that targeting and punishment by the commission decreasingly fit the predictions of a realist perspective, in which naming and shaming is an inherently political exercise, and increasingly fit the predictions of a liberal “reputation” perspective, in which governments hold others to their promises, and a constructivist “social conformity” perspective, in which governments distribute and respond to social rewards and punishments. With the end of the Cold War, the commission's targeting and punishment of countries was based less on partisan ties, power politics, and the privileges of membership, and more on those countries' actual human rights violations, treaty commitments, and active participation in cooperative endeavors such as peacekeeping operations.

This study employs sets of measures to compare the relative impact of 'donor interests' and 'human needs' on US foreign aid allocations in the presumably different Presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan (in his first term). The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, the complementarity of various assistance programs is assessed and the findings for the Carter and Reagan Administrations compared. Second, the donor interest and human needs variables are regressed on total foreign assistance and empirically-discerned aggregations of aid programs. Third, the first and second stages of the analysis are repeated on subsamples of nations that share either the same level of development or US alignment to determine whether the seemingly discrete variables employed in this analysis work in interaction. The results show that political-military considerations predominated in the foreign assistance policy of both Carter and Reagan. US military inducements were the primary determinant of US aid in the Carter years, and country alignment was most important in the Reagan penod. Moreover, the results indicate that economic interests determined assistance allocated to the least-developed countries in both Administrations. Human needs are found to play a secondary role in both Administrations. Finally, this study demonstrates the importance of disaggregating assistance for analysis.

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Economic theory and existing empirical studies do not unambiguously indicate whether higher military expenditures retard or promote economic growth, nor have there been systematic attempts to discern the sources of military spending to help determine how much of that spending can realistically be reduced. This article examines the theoretical link between military spending and economic growth, explores the domestic and regional causes of this spending, and tests a model incorporating a simultaneous relationship between military spending and economic growth in a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis on various groupings of Middle Eastern states. While the analysis is shown sensitive to assumptions about causality and the numerous problems of pooled data, the results indicate that higher military spending has suppressed economic growth in the Middle East region even when alternative measures of the military burden are used.