Inoculation strategies for victims of viruses and the sum-of-squares partition problem

Aspnes, James; Chang, Kevin L.; Yampolskiy, Aleksandr

doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2006.02.003

Cited by 135 publications

(177 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The authors of [15] design a mediator that implements a correlated equilibrium for a virus inoculation game [6,24]. In this game, there are n players, each corresponding to a node in a square grid.…”

Section: Mediation Metricsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Power of Mediation in an Extended El Farol Game

Mitsche

Saad

Saia

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. A mediator implements a correlated equilibrium when it proposes a strategy to each player confidentially such that the mediator's proposal is the best interest for every player to follow. In this paper, we present a mediator that implements the best correlated equilibrium for an extended El Farol game with symmetric players. The extended El Farol game we consider incorporates both negative and positive network effects. We study the degree to which this type of mediator can decrease the overall social cost. In particular, we give an exact characterization of Mediation Value (MV ) and Enforcement Value (EV ) for this game. MV is the ratio of the minimum social cost over all Nash equilibria to the minimum social cost over all mediators of this type, and EV is the ratio of the minimum social cost over all mediators of this type to the optimal social cost. This sort of exact characterization is uncommon for games with both kinds of network effects. An interesting outcome of our results is that both the MV and EV values can be unbounded for our game.

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Section: Mediation Metricsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Power of Mediation in an Extended El Farol Game

Mitsche

Saad

Saia

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…For example, the work of Hayrapetyan et al [22] and others [3,12] fully utilizes the social-network structure to "cut off" and contain various diffusive processes in a social network. As mentioned earlier, all this work is only concerned with vaccinating a set of nodes before the infection begins, however, and does not have the temporal component of the Firefighter problem.…”

Section: Minbudget(g S T )mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Questions about the spread of disease and epidemics in a social network have often been modeled using graph theory (e.g. [3,11]), and correspond to fundamental graph-theoretic concepts [22]. Moreover, these graph theoretic principles can be applied to many diffusive network processes, including epidemics in computer networks, the spread of innovations and ideas, and viral marketing [23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approximation Algorithms for the Firefighter Problem: Cuts over Time and Submodularity

Anshelevich

Chakrabarty

Hate

et al. 2009

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We provide approximation algorithms for several variants of the Firefighter problem on general graphs. The Firefighter problem models the case where an infection or another diffusive process (such as an idea, a computer virus, or a fire) is spreading through a network, and our goal is to stop this infection by using targeted vaccinations. Specifically, we are allowed to vaccinate at most B nodes per time-step (for some budget B), with the goal of minimizing the effect of the infection. The difficulty of this problem comes from its temporal component, since we must choose nodes to vaccinate at every time-step while the infection is spreading through the network, leading to notions of "cuts over time".We consider two versions of the Firefighter problem: a "non-spreading" model, where vaccinating a node means only that this node cannot be infected; and a "spreading" model where the vaccination itself is an infectious process, such as in the case where the infection is a harmful idea, and the vaccine to it is another infectious idea. We give complexity and approximation results for problems on both models.

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“…We plan to expand the analysis to different behavioral assumptions to narrow the gap between formal analysis and empirical observations in the field and the laboratory [17]. 6 Notwithstanding, we expect that the result provided in this paper will be of interest to security practitioners and researchers alike.…”

Section: Loosely and Tightly Coupled Contribution Functionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blue versus Red: Towards a Model of Distributed Security Attacks

Fultz

Großklags

2009

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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Abstract. This paper analyzes the threat of distributed attacks by developing a two-sided multiplayer model of security in which attackers aim to deny service and defenders strategize to secure their assets. Attackers benefit from the successful compromise of target systems, however, may suffer penalties for increased attack activity. Defenders weigh the likelihood of an attack against the cost of security. We model security decision-making in established (e.g., weakest-link, best-shot) and novel games (e.g., weakest target), and allow defense expenditures in protection and self-insurance technologies. We find that strategic attackers launch attacks only if defenders do not invest in protective measures. Therefore, the threat of protection can be enough to deter an attacker, but as the number of attackers grows, this equilibrium becomes increasingly unstable.

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Inoculation strategies for victims of viruses and the sum-of-squares partition problem

Cited by 135 publications

References 25 publications

The Power of Mediation in an Extended El Farol Game

The Power of Mediation in an Extended El Farol Game

Approximation Algorithms for the Firefighter Problem: Cuts over Time and Submodularity

Blue versus Red: Towards a Model of Distributed Security Attacks

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