Institution formation and cooperation with heterogeneous agents

Kube, Sebastian; Schaube, Sebastian; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Khachatryan, Elina

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.06.004

Cited by 24 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…There is a growing literature in experimental economics showing higher cooperation under democratically elected institutions compared to imposed institutions (Ostrom et al, 1992;Alm et al, 1999;Tyran and Feld, 2006;Dal Bó et al, 2010;Sutter et al, 2010;Markussen et al, 2014;Kamei et al, 2015;Kube et al, 2015), suggesting that the very existence of the option to select among alternatives (which is the essence of democracy) promotes conformance with regulations and increases cooperation (Sutter et al, 2010). When sanctions are seen as legitimate, they can even alter the preferences for rule compliance (Rodriguez-Sickert et al, 2008).…”

Section: Discussion Of Transmission Mechanisms Behind the Effect Of Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy and cooperation in commons management: experimental evidence of representative and direct democracy from community forests in Ethiopia

Gatiso

Vollan

2016

Envir. Dev. Econ.

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ABSTRACT. The authors use dynamic lab-in-the-field common pool resource experiments to investigate the role of two forms of democracy on the cooperation of forest users in Ethiopia. In this experimental setup, participants can either directly select a rule (direct democracy) or elect a leader who decides on the introduction of rules (representative democracy). These two treatments are compared with the imposition of rules and imposition of leaders. It is found that both endogenous leaders elected by the community members and endogenous rules selected by the direct involvement of the participants are more effective in promoting cooperation among the community members compared to exogenous leadership, exogenous rule imposition and the baseline scenario without any of these modifications. However, no significant difference is found between representative democracy in the election of leadership and direct democracy in the selection of rules. Leadership characteristics and behavior are further analyzed. The results underline the importance of democratic procedures.

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Section: Discussion Of Transmission Mechanisms Behind the Effect Of Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy and cooperation in commons management: experimental evidence of representative and direct democracy from community forests in Ethiopia

Gatiso

Vollan

2016

Envir. Dev. Econ.

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“…For instance, Andreoni (1993) and Gronberg et al (2012) find that minimum levels increase contributions in public goods games with concave payoff functions, and Chan et al (2002) find the same effect but also that it wears off as the minimum level is increased. 2 A related body of literature focuses on the effects of letting subjects in public goods experiments both suggest and subsequently agree on the level for contribution obligations (e.g., Kroll et al, 2007;Dannenberg, 2012;Dannenberg et al, 2014;Kesternich et al, 2014Kesternich et al, , 2018Kube et al, 2015;Gallier et al, 2017). 3 The two papers closest to our paper are Kocher et al (2016) and Keser et al (2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…() find the same effect but also that it wears off as the minimum level is increased . A related body of literature focuses on the effects of letting subjects in public goods experiments both suggest and subsequently agree on the level for contribution obligations (e.g., Kroll et al ., ; Dannenberg, ; Dannenberg et al ., ; Kesternich et al ., ; Kube et al ., ; Gallier et al ., ) . The two papers closest to our paper are Kocher et al .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Goods and Minimum Provision Levels: Does the Institutional Formation Affect Cooperation?*

Martinsson

Persson

2019

Scandinavian J Economics

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We investigate experimentally the role of institutional formation on the implementation of a binding minimum contribution level to a public good. Groups either face the minimum level exogenously imposed by a central authority, or are allowed to decide for themselves by means of a group vote whether a minimum level should be implemented. We find that a binding minimum contribution level has a positive and substantially significant effect on cooperation. Interestingly, we do not find an additional positive effect of democracy in the context of our experiment; the minimum‐level intervention is as effective when exogenously implemented as when endogenously chosen.

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“…The evolution of social complexity thus depends strongly on the existence of effective within-group suppression mechanisms-that is, enforcement that minimizes antisocial activity among group members (Frank, 1995;Bowles et al, 2003;Joyce, 2007). In particular, sanctioning institutions fare better than nonsanctioning ones (Gürerk et al, 2006), and fair institutions (i.e., which reduce free riding) are also more likely to evolve (Kosfeld et al, 2009;Kube et al, 2015) probably because they suppress within-group variability in selective outcomes. It is evident that individuals will actually perform third-party norm enforcement occurs in real-world situations in a variety of contexts (e.g., Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012;Yoeli et al, 2013;Tsusaka et al, 2015;Przepiorka and Berger, 2016).…”

Section: The Evolution Of Morality In the Human Lineagementioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Action as Cheater Suppression in Human Superorganisms

Aunger

2017

Front. Sociol.

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For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and other things [of Developments in human technology and social organization have enabled the kinds of social roles that individuals can undertake to proliferate-creating a degree of interdependence not seen in other species. Human societies cannot rely on shared genetic interests or dyadic reciprocity to ensure social cohesion because genetic similarity is low while indirect reciprocity is rife; nevertheless, such societies cohere, due to the evolution of novel regulatory mechanisms that inhibit defaulting on social obligations: moral sentiments and actions. While the degree of social cooperation created by these mechanisms remains less than that of the eusocial insects, it is sufficient to suggest that contemporary human societies constitute crude "superorganisms" to which their members have wide-ranging responsibilities. The present paper argues that the domains and extent of moral regulation can be most usefully identified by defining the set of functions required to sustain a human superorganism. These functions are shown to be boundary, production, distribution, storage, control, structure, enforcement, signaling, memory, excretion, perception, and reproduction. Moral obligations to act then arise when individuals default on contributing to these functions. Major evolutionary transition theory is used to justify claims as to the crucial aspects of superorganism functioning, which enabled human superorganismal groups to form, and thus what aspects of morality had to be developed since the time of our common ancestor with other primates. Finally, comparison is made to Moral Foundations Theory, and the Model of Moral Motives and Dyadic Morality approaches, which suggests that Human Superorganism Theory is simultaneously more parsimonious while being more broadly explanatory. We believe this new approach to defining the moral domain has implications for fields ranging from psychology to legal theory.

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Institution formation and cooperation with heterogeneous agents

Cited by 24 publications

References 46 publications

Democracy and cooperation in commons management: experimental evidence of representative and direct democracy from community forests in Ethiopia

Democracy and cooperation in commons management: experimental evidence of representative and direct democracy from community forests in Ethiopia

Public Goods and Minimum Provision Levels: Does the Institutional Formation Affect Cooperation?*

Moral Action as Cheater Suppression in Human Superorganisms

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