Institutional Change and State-Owned Enterprises: Reflections from the Petrobras case study

Abstract

The Brazilian oil and gas (O&G) sector has experienced institutional changes that put an end to the state monopoly. The purpose of this article is to explain why Petrobras has remained dominant after the sector had been opened to competition. We consider that it is possible to explain this paradox via two ideas that emanate from North's analysis on institutional change: first, by explaining institutional change as a continuous interrelation between formal and informal institutions and the political and economic organizations involved; second, by considering institutional change as a path-dependent process marked by a dialectic between elements of change and continuity.

New developmentalism in Brazil? The need for sectoral analysis

“…In line with the literature on other sectors (Paz 2015, Nem Singh 2012, Kröger 2012, Ban 2013, this article highlights continuities of state involvementalbeit by different meansthrough the period of neoliberalisation (Amann et al, 2006). New developmental practice in the steel sector were thus shaped by path dependencies.…”

“…We set out to examine the sectorally specific trajectories of new developmentalism in the Brazilian context. In this respect, the article makes an empirical contribution by detailing developments in the Brazilian steel sector, redressing the relative neglect of this sector in favour of the otherwise dominant discussions of oil and mining (Nem Singh and Massi, 2016, Nem Singh, 2013, Paz, 2015, Milanez and Santos, 2013, Milanez and Santos, 2015, Almeida et al, 2014. The article has consciously included the socio-environmental dimension as an addition to previously economically focused discussions of new developmentalism (Ebenau and Liberatore, 2013 are an exception here).…”

Government Versus Governance as a Framework to Analyze Mexico's Energy Reform Initiative and Key Comparisons in the World

“…Moreover, risk‐sharing contracts are prevalent mainly as production‐sharing, and other licenses, with royalty payments and tax levels similar to those of private corporations. The main differences in the three cases have been that (1) unionized political power ranges from low in Norway to high in Colombia; (2) regulations and regulatory agencies have been dispersed in Brazil, centralized in Colombia, and are in between in Norway; (3) the definition of the NOCs as productive and as international companies is rather strong in the case of Norway but less so in Brazil and Colombia; and (4) informal but strong power games have occurred at various levels of maturity in country government agencies and the Executive Branch as opposed to the NOCs' powers, ranging from a strong Statoil in Norway to a strong central government in Brazil, with Colombia somewhat in the middle (see Paz, ; Tissot, ; Tordo et al., ).…”

“…Regarding the role of IOCs in Brazil's new panorama, and according to the NPA, in 2003, IOCs and POCs drilled 4% of oil fields, whereas the figure was 12% in 2011. At the same time, IOCs and POCs controlled 36% of exploration in 2003, and 43% in 2011 (Paz, ).…”

“…(2) regulations and regulatory agencies have been dispersed in Brazil, centralized in Colombia, and are in between in Norway; (3) the definition of the NOCs as productive and as international companies is rather strong in the case of Norway but less so in Brazil and Colombia; and (4) informal but strong power games have occurred at various levels of maturity in country government agencies and the Executive Branch as opposed to the NOCs' powers, ranging from a strong Statoil in Norway to a strong central government in Brazil, with Colombia somewhat in the middle (see Paz, 2013;Tissot, 2010;Tordo et al, 2011).…”