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After signing ten free trade agreements between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign trade policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina. Criticism of multiple regional trade agreements (RTAs) arises from a consistency test, but also from the ability of a country to administer them. Mexico's multiple agreements have generally used the principle of NAFTA consistency, after the acceptance that NAFTA became a broader and deeper accord than results of the Uruguay multilateral achievements. An analysis of multiple RTAs is presented, including a game model of equilibrium, along with a political economy approach of why Mexico seeks multiple RTAs as its foreign trade policy.

After signing ten free trade agreements between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign trade policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina. Criticism of multiple regional trade agreements (RTAs) arises from a consistency test, but also from the ability of a country to administer them. Mexico's multiple agreements have generally used the principle of NAFTA consistency, after the acceptance that NAFTA became a broader and deeper accord than results of the Uruguay multilateral achievements. An analysis of multiple RTAs is presented, including a game model of equilibrium, along with a political economy approach of why Mexico seeks multiple RTAs as its foreign trade policy.

In Mexico, President Enrique Peña Nieto's new administration has actively passed proposals to reform at least six key policy aspects of the country's economic life, arguing that it is moving toward efficient government and a new enhanced social orientation dearly needed in that society. Using the theoretical framework of the definition of government versus governance in political economy and organization, the strengths and potential weaknesses of the proposed reforms are put into perspective with emphasis on the energy reform passed in August 2013, and under discussion in Mexico's Congress until the end of the year. The theoretical framework is also useful to make a comparison of the proposal with governance structures in oil companies that the Peña Nieto administration has mentioned as paradigms for Mexico, namely Petrobras, Ecopetrol, and Statoil. With this framework, true economic efficiency incentives and welfare sharing under Mexico's proposal can finally be delineated.