Spaghetti regionalism or strategic foreign trade: some evidence for Mexico

Abstract

After signing ten free trade agreements between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign trade policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina. Criticism of multiple regional trade agreements (RTAs) arises from a consistency test, but also from the ability of a country to administer them. Mexico's multiple agreements have generally used the principle of NAFTA consistency, after the acceptance that NAFTA became a broader and deeper accord than results of the Uruguay multilateral achievements. An analysis of multiple RTAs is presented, including a game model of equilibrium, along with a political economy approach of why Mexico seeks multiple RTAs as its foreign trade policy.

Sequencing Negotiating Partners: Implications for the Two‐Level Game?

“…International trade can have powerful effects on domestic political coalitions (Rogowski 1987 and 1989) and the proreform sectors in both countries hoped that FTAs would serve to significantly weaken antireform sectors and reduce their political leverage as a consequence (Irwin 1993 and 1995; Mansfield and Milner 1999). In addition, entering the FTA game can help reinforce security arrangements (Gowa 1994; Mansfield and Milner 1999) and improve a country's international status (Ibarra‐Yunez 2003), two other potential political benefits. Finally, successful conclusion of an FTA can also have a “capacity building” benefit as a country's negotiators are able to gain skills that they might utilize in future FTA negotiations (Okamoto 2003; Aggarwal and Koo 2005; Solís and Katada 2007b).…”

CELAC: Mexican Foreign Policy Interest on Latin American and Caribbean Regionalism

“…The US government is the biggest trading partner for Mexico. About 80% of Mexico's exports go to the US market, and around 47% of Mexico's imports are supplied by the US (Campos-Vázquez, 2013;Escobar Gamboa, 2013;Esquivel & Rodrıǵuez-López, 2003;Hanson, 2003;Ibarra-Yunez, 2003;Moreno-Brid, Santamaría, & Rivas Valdivia, 2005;Ramirez, 2003Ramirez, , 2006Spreen, 2000;Villanueva, 2017;Villarreal, 2017;Waldkirch, 2010) Based on the background above, the objective of this paper is to analyze the sources of foreign policy consideration of Mexican government joining the CELAC regional cooperation amid a fairly strategic bilateral relationship with the United States. The research is expected to contribute to the reference to International Relations studies relating to the theory and analysis of foreign policy especially those interested in the American politics and regionalism.…”