Institutional diffusion for the Minamata Convention on Mercury

Abstract

A trinity composed of legally binding regulations, an independent financial mechanism, and a compliance mechanism characterizes the institutional design of the Minamata Convention on Mercury. Meanwhile, few existing environmental treaties feature an independent financial mechanism as well as a compliance mechanism. Why did the Minamata Convention acquire two mechanisms? There are two rival hypotheses on uncertainty about institutional consequences and international agreements. The rational design school posits that countries can predict institutional consequences by acquiring all pieces of relevant information (Koremenos et al. 2001) and views the trinity as a rational design to enhance developing countries' regulatory capabilities under strict compliance. In contrast, the institutional diffusion school assumes that countries have limited information-processing abilities and use cognitive heuristics in designing institutions and argues that countries designed the trinity by learning from existing cases (Ovodenko and Keohane 2012). In this paper, I compare the negotiations process of the Minamata Convention with that of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). To test the hypotheses, I examine how countries resolved informational uncertainty in both negotiations by utilizing negotiations records and personal interviews with key officials as data. The analytical results support the institutional diffusion hypothesis by indicating that the trinity within the Minamata Convention is a product of countries' heuristic and incremental learning from existing treaties. for their invaluable comments. I wish to thank my interviewees for their insights about the negotiations on the Minamata Convention and the organization of the UNEP. Compliance with ethical standards: The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Detecting Illegal Intercountry Trade of Mercury Using Discrepancies in Mirrored Trade Data

“…9,10 The Convention's advantage over other environmental conventions is that it includes a tripartite institutional design comprising legally binding regulations, an independent financial mechanism, and a compliance mechanism. 11 As the international movement to phase out mercury gains momentum, concerns about international mercury trade are increasing. 12 Article 3 of the Convention includes provisions to control international mercury trade and adopts a prior informed consent procedure.…”

“…Our society is phasing out mercury through international environmental regulations because of its damaging effects on human health and ecosystems. Regulations targeting mercury-added products include the End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) directive of 2003, the Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) directive of 2006 in the European Union (EU), and the Electronic Waste Recycling Act (EWRA) of 2007 in California. − Additionally, the EU and the United States have directly banned the exports of mercury since 2011 and 2013, respectively. , To control mercury’s anthropogenic life cycle internationally, including mining, international trade, production, use, and waste management, the Minamata Convention on Mercury (hereafter, “Convention”) was adopted in 2013. , The Convention came into force in 2017 and currently includes 137 party countries. , The Convention’s advantage over other environmental conventions is that it includes a tripartite institutional design comprising legally binding regulations, an independent financial mechanism, and a compliance mechanism . As the international movement to phase out mercury gains momentum, concerns about international mercury trade are increasing…”

The Shadow of History in Inter-Organizational Cooperation for the Environment

“…Since cooperation under the Minamata Convention was initiated upon its adoption, a prior institution for inter-organizational cooperation outside the Minamata Convention could influence their cooperative arrangements. Uji (2019) found that experiences implementing chemicals treaties, including the Stockholm and Rotterdam treaties, influenced the institutional design for the Minamata Convention. 1 Therefore, it is likely that cooperation between IOs on one environmental issue can influence cooperation on another.…”