2013
DOI: 10.1111/corg.12046
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Institutional Frameworks, Venture Capital and the Financing of European New Technology‐based Firms

Abstract: Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue We first study how cross‐country differences in shareholder protection against self‐dealing and personal bankruptcy laws affect the financing of new technology‐based firms (NTBFs). Second, we study how venture capital (VC) investors – as expert monitors and initiators of “good” governance practices in firms – moderate aforementioned relationships. Research Findings/Insights Using a unique longitudinal dataset of 6,813 NTBFs from six European countries, we find … Show more

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Cited by 33 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…(Liao et al 2014 Decisions to stay local/national players How do cross-country differences in shareholder protection against self-dealing and personal bankruptcy laws affect the financing of new technology-based firms (NTBFs)? (Vanacker et al 2014) Better shareholder protection rights increase the probability of raising external equity financing and allow firms to raise larger amounts of equity financing. Less forgiving personal bankruptcy laws decrease the probability of raising debt financing and limit the amount of debt financing that is raised.…”
Section: Concepts Under Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Liao et al 2014 Decisions to stay local/national players How do cross-country differences in shareholder protection against self-dealing and personal bankruptcy laws affect the financing of new technology-based firms (NTBFs)? (Vanacker et al 2014) Better shareholder protection rights increase the probability of raising external equity financing and allow firms to raise larger amounts of equity financing. Less forgiving personal bankruptcy laws decrease the probability of raising debt financing and limit the amount of debt financing that is raised.…”
Section: Concepts Under Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These authors also show that investor protection strengthens the effects of both types of regulatory agency (state and private monitoring) on board independency. Vanacker, Heughebaert, and Manigart (2014) [M076] provide evidence that higher antidirector rights index and venture capital ownership simultaneously increase the likelihood for firms to choose equity over debt financing. Kim and Ozdemir (2014) [M080] use a multi-level model to show that firm-level governance attributes such as board size with investor protection and market for corporate control affect board structure.…”
Section: What Country-level Governance Factors Have Been Used To Explmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…He underlines the qualities of entrepreneurs by mentioning that it must be APJIE 12,1 accompanied by seven other intangibles, including, access to novel ideas, role models, informal forums, region-specific opportunities, safety nets, access to large markets and executive leadership (Venkataraman, 2004). In addition to those mentioned above, the regional innovation environment, personal bankruptcy legislation, protection of entrepreneur as shareholder and tax system for entrepreneur are pointed out in previous research as necessary policy measures for entrepreneur sector Toschi, 2015, Armour andVanacker et al, 2014;Revest and Sapio, 2012). Avnimelech et al (2010) uphold an evolutionary approach based on the case studies of Israel, which is well recognized as a haven for the VC market and start-ups.…”
Section: Implication Of Government Venture Capitals In Japanmentioning
confidence: 99%