2008
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1864274
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Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: A New Zealand Perspective

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Cited by 9 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…This positive relationship can be an outcome of the monitoring exercised by institutional investors who put in place adequate governance mechanisms that lower both agency problems and information asymmetry and enhance, thus, the firm performance (Alvarez et al, 2016; Boone & White, 2015; Demiralp et al, 2011). As a matter of fact, this finding contradicts previous studies, which report that institutional investors exercise no monitoring on management or prioritize their private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Tan & Keeper, 2008).…”
Section: Resultscontrasting
confidence: 93%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This positive relationship can be an outcome of the monitoring exercised by institutional investors who put in place adequate governance mechanisms that lower both agency problems and information asymmetry and enhance, thus, the firm performance (Alvarez et al, 2016; Boone & White, 2015; Demiralp et al, 2011). As a matter of fact, this finding contradicts previous studies, which report that institutional investors exercise no monitoring on management or prioritize their private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Tan & Keeper, 2008).…”
Section: Resultscontrasting
confidence: 93%
“…Moreover, addressing governance issues of investees involves substantial costs. These costs range from the search for legal and professional advice to the time and other resources spent by employees on such matters, which could be used to accomplish other investments and tasks instead (Black & Coffee, Jr., 1994; Tan & Keeper, 2008). Finally, the free‐rider problem harshly impedes institutional activism.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the contrary, other studies have mentioned that mutual funds are assumed to be less involved in the governance of the company compared with other institutions, and they are believed to be more concerned with just profit-making (Hoskisson et al, 2002;Tan and Keeper, 2008).…”
Section: Investment Companies/mutual Fundsmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…Because the added value of the active institution’s effort typically does not compensate for its costs, no institution should undertake such actions (Tan and Keeper, 2008). Moreover, the free-rider problem arises where all shareholders enjoy the benefits at the expense of the few who undertake expensive monitoring actions.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%