Institutional isomorphism and the Asian Development Bank's accountability mechanism: something old, something new; something borrowed, something blue?

Abstract

In the 1990s Multilateral Development Banks created accountability mechanisms (AMs) that allowed people affected by development projects redress. Currently undertheorized, this paper examines how and why the Asian Development Bank (ADB) created an AM, and whether the AM serves its purpose to hold the ADB to account and to provide 'fair hearing of the views of the affected group'. This article argues that the ADB created a new AM because of institutional isomorphism, borrowing the idea of the AM from the World Bank as a result of coercive and mimetic isomorphic processes. Further, that the ADB introduced a mechanism ill-suited to the pre-existing (old) organizational culture of the ADB, which is based on consensus and hierarchical rule-following in the context of ADB operations to further economic growth while upholding state sovereignty. Despite its restructure and recent review, the mechanism's weakness was revealed through a stand-off between China and the AM over an investigation begun in 2009 (creating something 'blue'). The paper concludes that the AM's ability to serve its purpose will remain hampered as long as ADB maintains consensus around economic growth and state sovereignty over providing recourse to affected people.

Assessing Accountability in Practice: The Asian Development Bank's Accountability Mechanism

“…The ADB followed the World Bank and the IDB in creating an ‘external’ accountability mechanism that would provide recourse to people ‘directly, materially and adversely affected’ by an ADB‐financed project (ADB, , p. 9). The Inspection Function was created in 1995 at the behest of donor member states who were increasingly concerned with the impact of MDB operations (Park, ). Concerns over the bank's performance emerged as a result of an internal Taskforce on Improving Project Quality established in 1993.…”

“…The CRP chose not to progress the investigation because it could not conduct an investigation without visiting the project site. The issue went to the Board where donor Executive Directors stridently disagreed with China's reasons for not allowing an investigation, but did not call for a formal Board vote, thus letting the issue drop (Park, , pp. 14–16).…”

“…The ADB board accepted three recommendations and modified the remaining three, a significant departure from established practice (CRP, ). Upholding state sovereignty remains a key concern for the ADB, which interferes with the AM's aim to provide recourse to affected people (Park, ).…”

“…The first and second Special Project Facilitators were career ADB staff appointed at the level of a Director General by the ADB with little regard for international legitimacy – despite this role requiring the trust of communities and NGOs. This undermined the AM's credibility (Park, , p. 16). The new Special Project Facilitator was externally appointed and is assisted by ADB staff.…”

How Rising Powers Create Governance Gaps: The Case of Export Credit and the Environment

“…Many of the projects financed by ECAs, such as large dams, power plants, mines, oil and gas, dredging and port construction, carry the potential for significant environmental and social implications. Yet while efforts to improve the environmental and social practices of the multilateral development banks have been the subject of extensive research and analysis (Buntaine 2016;Park 2014;Zawahri and Weinthal 2014), the activities of ECAs have received far less scholarly attention (Blackmon 2017).…”