Institutionalizing Social Accountability? Participation and the PRS Process in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua

Abstract

One goal of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process was to ensure that aid resources would be used to produce development results. Participation of civil society groups in the creation and monitoring of poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs) was expected to help achieve this goal: civil society actors would hold government accountable for developing and implementing pro-poor strategies. This article examines whether the formal structure of the PRS process in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua managed to institutionalize this form of 'social accountability'. The PRS process had a different character in each country, and different participatory bodies were formed, but common patterns emerge in the three cases. Civil society actors used the PRS process to engage in policy dialogue with government officials (and in some cases donors) and showed comparatively little interest in monitoring implementation of the strategies or evaluating performance in producing development results.Un des objectifs du processus des Strate´gies de Re´duction de la Pauvrete´e´tait de s 0 assurer que les ressources d 0 aide au de´veloppement seraient utilise´es pour produire des re´sultats concrets et mesurables. La participation des groupes de socie´te´civile a`la cre´ation, gestion et au suivi des Strate´gies de Re´duction de la Pauvrete´devait aider, pensait-on, a`atteindre cet objectif: les acteurs des socie´te´s civiles devaient responsabiliser les gouvernements quant au de´veloppement et a`la mise en place de strate´gies d 0 aide aux plus pauvres. Cet article cherche a`de´terminer si la structure formelle du processus des Strate´gies de Re´duction de la Pauvrete´en Bolivie, au Honduras et au Nicaragua a permis d 0 institutionnaliser une telle forme de 'responsabilite´sociale'. Les processus mis en place dans chacun de ces pays e´taient de natures diffe´rentes, et diffe´rents types d 0 organisations participatives s 0 y sont forme´es, mais il y a plusieurs aspects communs aux trois cas. En particulier, les acteurs de la socie´te´civile ont utilise´le processus pour engager un dialogue politique avec les repre´sentants gouvernementaux (et dans certains cas les bailleurs) mais se sont montre´s relativement peu enclins a`participer au suivi de la mise en place des strate´gies ou a`e´valuer l 0 efficacite´des programmes en termes de de´veloppement.

A right-to-left policy switch? An analysis of the Honduran case under Manuel Zelaya

“…The law itself was the continuation of institutional channels of civil society participation which had been developing since the end of the 1990s under the framework of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries – Poverty Reduction Strategy (HIPC-PRS). Financed by IFIs such as the World Bank, the HIPC-PRS required the consultation and participation of civil society in order for countries to accede to debt reduction (see Cuesta, 2007; Dewachter and Molenaers, 2011; Komives, 2011). In the Honduran case, this led to the creation of the Consultative Council (Consejo Consultivo), composed of members of the government and civil society in equal proportions, which played an important role in the formation of the CPL and its participatory institutions.…”

“…Their efforts started to gain momentum after the devastation of hurricane Mitch and the subsequent reconstruction in 1998, and these groups were often linked to the IFI-financed PRS process and its incentives for civil society participation (Cuesta, 2007; Dewachter and Molenaers, 2011). While the PRS process opened new avenues for mobilization and strengthened participation, the participatory options offered to civil society actors were more consultative and informative than possessing any real power-sharing agenda (Dewachter and Molenaers, 2011; Komives, 2011). However strengthened they may have been, Honduran social movements and civil society remained diffuse and relatively weak when compared with many other Latin American countries, lacking the capacity to mount any legitimate challenge to the status quo (Castellanos, 2006).…”