Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto

Woolley, John T.

doi:10.2307/2111364

Cited by 46 publications

(32 citation statements)

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“…These results are consistent with previous studies of the veto, such as Rohde and Simon (1985) and Woolley (1991), which have emphasized institutional factors and disregarded individual presidential choice and discretion.…”

Section: Institutional Variablessupporting

confidence: 92%

Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto

Gilmour¹

2002

The Journal of Politics

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This article evaluates and compares "president" and "presidency" centered explanations of presidential activity with respect to one important presidential power, the veto. Using individual bill data for nine congresses characterized by divided party government, I estimate a logistic regression model of presidential vetoes. This contrasts with previous research, which has used annual aggregate data. Using individual bill data allows controls for objectionable legislation passed by Congress and enables me to measure and compare the "propensity to veto" of different presidents. I conclude that presidential vetoes are in substantial measure caused by Congress passing objectionable bills, but that even controlling for congressional behavior, presidents exhibit strikingly different veto behavior. Ford was most prone to using the veto, and Reagan, the least. Although external factors exert great influence on the president's veto decision, the individual choices and strategies of presidents also have an important influence.A paradox of the American presidency is that this office, routinely called the most powerful on Earth, is also said by many observers to allow its incumbent relatively little autonomy. Neustadt (1960) asked whether the president was a "leader or clerk." Similarly, recent work has focused on "president" versus "presidency" centered explanations of presidential activity (Hager and Sullivan 1994;Shields and Huang 1997). Presidency-centered explanations suppose that the president is a clerk and that presidential behavior is a function of the institutional setting of the president. From this perspective, the individual attributes and idiosyncratic strategic choices of presidents have little influence, and presidents make the choices they do because of externally imposed constraints over which they have little control. The essence of the presidency-centered approach is the view "that most presidents would behave similarly in similar contexts" (Hager and Sullivan 1994, 1081). President-centered explanations suppose that the president makes choices that are not determined by outside factors and that individual attributes of the president will make a difference. According to the president-centered view, the president will have the freedom of action to im-

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Section: Institutional Variablessupporting

confidence: 92%

Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto

Gilmour¹

2002

The Journal of Politics

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“…Congressional incumbents often appeal to parochial and constituency service-type activities and legislation in an effort to cross partisan barriers and appeal to as many voters as possible (Mayhew 1974). These distributive activities may alienate the president who is likely to have a much more comprehensive legislative agendaincreasing institutional conflict (Hoff 1991, Woolley 1991. For example, during the 1978 midterm congressional election year, President Carter vetoed a Public Works bill (HR12928) designed to increase spending for water and energy development.…”

Section: Institutional Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another factor likely to increase executive-legislative conflict is the sheer total number of bills that a president receives in a legislative year (Woolley 1991). According to Hoff (1991: 316), &dquo;to the extent that a large number of laws deal with controversial domestic matters or interfere with the president's foreign policy priorities, there is a greater likelihood for inter-institutional conflict&dquo; (see also Simonton 1987).4 Finally, Woolley (1991: 225) argues that the very large number of vetoes during the Ford administration represents exceptional institutional conflict produced by extraordinary circumstances.…”

Section: Institutional Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They found that presidential popularity, the proportion of seats in Congress controlled by the president's party, and the existence of an international conflict all decreased presidential use of the veto. The midterm congressional election year and an &dquo;Economic/Political Context Interaction&dquo; variable, however, exerted a significant and positive effect on presidential vetoes. Based upon Rhode and Simon's work, Woolley (1991) extended the data set through 1986 and found (for major bills) that both the president's support in Congress and his level of public support significantly decreased the use of the veto; while the number of bills passed by Congress (as well as a dummy variable for the Ford administration) significantly increased veto use. I In the same year Hoff (1991) forcefully argued that pocket vetoes and regular vetoes should be analyzed separately.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While only one empirical investigation of modem presidential veto use has considered the importance of legislative activity(Woolley: 1991), the remaining ones have not taken this relationship into account(Rhode and Simon 1985;Watson 1993). at TIB/UB Hannover on January 3, 2015 prq.sagepub.com Downloaded from…”

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confidence: 99%

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Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model

Shields

Huang

1995

Political Research Quarterly

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We argue that past models of presidential veto behavior have not adequately conceptualized the fundamental nature of the dependent variable—a count of the total number of vetoes per unit of analysis. Consequently, ordinary least squares techniques have been employed when more appropriate statistical estimation techniques are warranted. Further, past conceptualization (and measurement) of theoretically relevant variables have masked important relationships such as the importance of a bicameral legislature. We show that rigorous consideration of research methodologies provides theoretical insights obscured by relying on more traditional approaches. Finally, this investigation updates understanding of the veto process through the first year of the Clinton administration.

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President and Congress in the Period of Unified Government in America

Tsai

2021

Presidents, Unified Government and Legislative Control

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Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto

Cited by 46 publications

References 16 publications

Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto

Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto

Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model

President and Congress in the Period of Unified Government in America

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