2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.10.010
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Insurance choice and tax-preferred health savings accounts

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Cited by 22 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Remler and Glied (2006) find that HSAs have the potential to increase cost-sharing in health care and, thus, reduce moral hazard. Cardon and Showalter (2007) theoretically demonstrate that HSAs will lead to higher deductibles and copayments in health insurance. In addition, they conduct a simulation and find that, in the absence of adverse selection, HSAs will induce an increase in overall welfare.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…Remler and Glied (2006) find that HSAs have the potential to increase cost-sharing in health care and, thus, reduce moral hazard. Cardon and Showalter (2007) theoretically demonstrate that HSAs will lead to higher deductibles and copayments in health insurance. In addition, they conduct a simulation and find that, in the absence of adverse selection, HSAs will induce an increase in overall welfare.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…HSAs and HRAs are fairly new to the health insurance market. They can help reduce spending by giving employees more direct control over funds spent on their coverage (CAHI.org 2004): Cardon and Showalter (2007) develop an infinite horizon utility maximization model of the interaction between insurance choice and tax-preferred health savings accounts. The model can be used to examine a wide range of policy options, including flexible spending accounts, health savings accounts, and health reimbursement accounts.…”
Section: Health Insurance Optionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• When the controlling epicenter is the production/delivery system, the problems of overpricing, price-gouging, underserving ghetto markets, duplicate testing and unnecessary surgery, overprescriptions of drugs, underserving neonatal care, and overserving elderly care, and the like have generated hyper health care inflation as in Figure 3 (e.g., D'Cruz & Kini, 2008). • When control is moved to the health care financing sector, especially the commercial health insurance companies, the typical problems are exorbitant premiums, unacceptable profit margins, high co-pays and insurer-controlled health care delivery (e.g., Cardon & Showalter, 2007). • When the court of law becomes the focus in a highly litigious society like the United States, the result is unacceptably high malpractice insurance that will force greatly skilled and well intentioned physician into administration and other professions and/or into early retirement.…”
Section: Information Asymmetry In the Health Care Systemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The government can take the lead role to make this happen to turnaround health care (e.g., flexible spending accounts, medical savings accounts). (Cardon & Showalter, 2007;Mascarenhas, Kesavan, & Bernacchi, 2003) The CJ is much more relevant to most disadvantaged health care consumer: Egalitarian DJ is linked with the doctrines of consumer vulnerability, disadvantage and detriment, and, thus, is particularly relevant with vulnerable market segments such as pregnant mothers, children, teenagers, patientconsumers living in ghettos and the elderly. Vulnerability implies some form of "forced choice" or an inability to resist a market offering owing to partial information.…”
Section: Corrective Justice: As Policy For Information Asymmetry Redumentioning
confidence: 99%