2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium 2011
DOI: 10.1109/csf.2011.9
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Integrated Specification and Verification of Security Protocols and Policies

Abstract: We propose a language for formal specification of serviceoriented architectures. The language supports the integrated specification of communication level events, policy level decisions, and the interaction between the two. We show that the reachability problem is decidable for a fragment of service-oriented architectures. The decidable fragment is well suited for specifying, and reasoning about, securitysensitive architectures. In the decidable fragment, the attacker controls the communication media. The poli… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…Here, we extend our previous results [21] in two directions: (1) We have negative statements in guards, and we allow the policy statements to be retracted from the extensional policies of the processes. The negative guards and the retraction of policy statements enable us to naturally model non-monotonic behaviors, such as revocation of rights.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 77%
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“…Here, we extend our previous results [21] in two directions: (1) We have negative statements in guards, and we allow the policy statements to be retracted from the extensional policies of the processes. The negative guards and the retraction of policy statements enable us to naturally model non-monotonic behaviors, such as revocation of rights.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 77%
“…We discuss, within an example, how our decision algorithm can help policy writers to detect these situations; see § 2.3. (2) We give a decision algorithm for a rich set of policies, which strictly subsumes the type-1 policy theories of [21]. For instance, transitive policy rules (see § 2.1), which are not permitted in type-1 theories, can be analyzed using our decision algorithm.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…To our knowledge no work has previously considered the automatic orchestration of security services with policies altogether as ours. However there are some interesting related attempts to analyze security protocols and trust management [17,11]. In [17] the author uniformly models security protocols and access control based on trust management.…”
Section: Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We also consider an integrated framework for protocols and policies but in our case i) policies can be explicitly negative such as non-disclosure policies and separation-of-duty ii) we propose a decision procedure for the related trust negotiation problem iii) we do not consider indistinguishability properties. In [11] security protocols are combined with authorization logics that can be expressed with acyclic Horn clauses. The authors encode the derivation of authorization predicates (for a service) as subprotocols and can reuse in that way the constraint solving algorithm from [19] to obtain a decision procedure.…”
Section: Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%