2019
DOI: 10.1109/access.2019.2892745
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Integrating Model Checking With SysML in Complex System Safety Analysis

Abstract: Modern complex systems are characterized by numerous complex interactions and high levels of integration of functions, which present new challenges from the viewpoints of system safety analysis and design. Model checking can be employed to perform safety analysis, identify potential hazards, and prove the correctness of complex systems. However, many types of construction models are expressed in different ways, and there exists no unified model. Thus, the integration of model checking with system modeling lang… Show more

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Cited by 44 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…Formal verification of UML and SysML diagrams commonly relies on translating one UML or SysML model into a formal model [11]. Translation from UML/SysML to state/transition models has been formalized in the context of Petri nets [7,8,12,13], automata for NuSMV model checker [14], timed automata [9] for UPPAAL model checker, hybrid automata [15], model checker NuSMV [16], probabilistic model checker PRISM [6,15], and a theorem prover [17].…”
Section: A Formal Verification Of Safety Properties In Uml and Sysml Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Formal verification of UML and SysML diagrams commonly relies on translating one UML or SysML model into a formal model [11]. Translation from UML/SysML to state/transition models has been formalized in the context of Petri nets [7,8,12,13], automata for NuSMV model checker [14], timed automata [9] for UPPAAL model checker, hybrid automata [15], model checker NuSMV [16], probabilistic model checker PRISM [6,15], and a theorem prover [17].…”
Section: A Formal Verification Of Safety Properties In Uml and Sysml Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…from an input source model based on transformation rules [33]. Transformation rules are the set of formal definitions [34] that define how one or more constructs in source model language map to one or more constructs in target model language [18]. While developing transformation rules, main focus is to reduce overall efforts and information loses during transformation process [17].…”
Section: B Transformation Rulesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The OS abstraction layer provides the OS-independent abstraction to the ARINC-653 core layer, so that the implementation of the upper layer can be reused without modifications for different platforms. This can make the modeling and verification of software much easier and improve the safety [15], [16].…”
Section: B Layered and Modular Designmentioning
confidence: 99%