Intelligence reform in new democracies: factors supporting or arresting progress

Abstract

This article examines an important (and most problematic) component of the democratic civil-military relations (CMR) concept (understood in terms of democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency of the armed forces, police forces, and intelligence agencies). It focuses (1) on the democratization of intelligence, that is finding a proper balance between intelligence effectiveness and transparency, and (2) on what particular factors support or arrest progress in the democratization of intelligence. The article provides supporting examples from Brazil and Romania, two developing democracies that have been undergoing major reforms of their intelligence systems for almost 20 years, in terms of both transparency and effectiveness.

Trust and Transparency in an Age of Surveillance

“…In Poland, there are still not enough civilian experts and supervisory institutions. The small number of private experts has historical reasons, since before the political transformation security research was dominated by the communist party structures (Matei and Bruneau 2011). At the same time, the security services have centralized and hierarchical structures that minimize access from the outside.…”

“…However, secret surveillance can also be used to protect human rights, e.g., potential victims of crime or terrorist attacks. Thus, this chapter recasts the conflict in surveillance policy as a dilemma between secrecy and transparency (Matei and Bruneau 2011). Secrecy ensures the effectiveness of security services, and thus agencies lobby for solutions that limit transparency.…”

National Intelligence Systems as Networks: Power Distribution and Organizational Risk in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

“…The respective Centralization indexes for Brazil (0.206), Russia (0.364), _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 23 Russell Swenson has called our attention (e-mail to the authors) to this particular important motivation for rulers to design Intelligence Systems with more than one agency. See Gill (1994) and also Matei and Bruneau (2011) for historical examples when an intelligence and security apparatus became too powerful up to a point of usurping power to itself by forming a police state (Brazil's SNI or South Africa's BOSS). 24 For an institutionalist theory of intelligenge systems development, see Zegart (1999).…”

Intelligence Reform in Brazil: A Long, Drawn-Out Process

“…Having followed this issue for a decade and a half, however, and seen no real improvement, I must conclude that any improvement in the near future is unlikely. 24 At least six reasons, or factors, must be considered in dealing with the challenges of achieving effectiveness in Brazil's intelligence system. First, as noted earlier, no mention is made of the intelligence function in the extremely long and detailed Brazilian Constitution of 1988.…”