Increasingly large trip demands have strained urban transportation capacity, which consequently leads to traffic congestion. In this work, we focus on mitigating traffic congestion by incentivizing passengers to switch from private to public transit services. We address the following challenges. First, the passengers incur inconvenience costs when participating in traffic offload due to delay and discomfort, and thus need to be reimbursed. The inconvenience cost, however, is unknown to the government when choosing the incentives. Furthermore, participating in traffic offload raises privacy concerns from passengers. An adversary could infer personal information, (e.g., daily routine, region of interest, and wealth), by observing the decisions made by the government, which are known to the public. We adopt the concept of differential privacy and propose privacy-preserving incentive designs under two settings, denoted as two-way communication and one-way communication. Under two-way communication, we focus on how the government should reveal passengers' inconvenience costs to properly incentivize them while preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as a mixed integer linear program, and propose a polynomial-time approximation algorithm. We show the proposed approach achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, social optimality, and differential privacy. Under one-way communication, we focus on how the government should design the incentives without revealing passengers' inconvenience costs while still preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as a convex program, and propose a differentially private and near-optimal solution algorithm. A numerical case study using Caltrans Performance Measurement System (PeMS) data source is presented as evaluation.
arXiv:1906.01683v1 [cs.CY] 4 Jun 2019integer linear program. We propose an efficient approximation algorithm to reduce the computation complexity. • We prove that the proposed mechanism design under two-way communication achieves approximate optimal social welfare, truthfulness, individual rationality, and differential privacy. • For the one-way communication, we formulate the problem as an online convex program. We give a polynomialtime algorithm to solve for the mechanism design. We prove that the proposed mechanism is differentially private and Hannan consistent. • We present a numerical case study with real-world trace data as evaluation. The results show that the proposed approach achieves individual rationality and non-negative social welfare, and is privacy preserving. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related works in Section II. In Section III, we present the problem formulation under two-way and one-way communication settings, respectively. We present the proposed incentive mechanism design in Section IV for the two-way communication setting. Section V gives the proposed solution for one-way communication setting. The proposed approaches are demonstrated using a numerical case study in Sectio...