Intention and Weakness of Will

Holton, Richard

doi:10.2307/2564667

Cited by 251 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…two quite distinct notions (Holton 1999). 1 The first is the idea of acting contrary to one's best judgement-the idea that is to the fore in classical discussions of akrasia.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What in the world is weakness of will?

May

Holton

2010

Philos Stud

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At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia-i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one's judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton claims that it doesn't, while Alfred Mele argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary concept here is one apt for empirical investigation. We evaluate Mele's studies and report some experiments of our own in order to investigate what in the world the ordinary concept of weakness of will is. We conclude that neither Mele nor Holton (previously) was quite right and offer a tentative proposal of our own: the ordinary notion is more like a prototype or cluster concept whose application is affected by a variety of factors.

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“…two quite distinct notions (Holton 1999). 1 The first is the idea of acting contrary to one's best judgement-the idea that is to the fore in classical discussions of akrasia.…”

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confidence: 99%

What in the world is weakness of will?

May

Holton

2010

Philos Stud

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“…Comme le rappelle David Owens dans son etude critique, ce n'est que tres recemment que Richard Holton a propose de distinguer l'akrasie de la faiblesse de la volonte, soit le manque de resolution, au sens ou un agent n'accomplit pas une action qu'il avait pourtant l'intention (le meilleur vouloir) d'accomplir 17 . II s'agit bel et bien, comme chez saint Paul, d'une incapacity de pouvoir faire ce qu'on veut pourtant faire.…”

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Faiblesse de la raison ou faiblesse de volonté: peut-on choisir?

Pironet

Tappolet

2003

Dialogue

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Si l'homme est un être doté de raison et se distingue des autres animaux par sa capacité à réfléchir sur ses actes tant avant de les poser qu'après, il lui arrive cependant d'être irrationnel. Tandis que certains s'en désolent, considérant les différentes formes d'irrationalité comme autant d'expressions de notre inaptitude à atteindre la sagesse, d'autres semblent plutôt s'en réjouir, estimant que la possibilité de ne pas se conformer à ce que dicte ou suggère la raison est une preuve de notre radicale liberté. Mais quel que soit le jugement moral, explicite ou implicite, porté sur ces phénomènes, la plupart des philosophes ne se contentent pas de les constater. Ils tentent de les cerner, d'en comprendre les mécanismes, parfois de les justifier. Comment et pourquoi? Telles sont les questions auxquelles voudrait répondre ce numéro portant sur la délibération et l'irrationalité dans l'histoire.

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“…From this perspective, individuals form intentions that they actively revise in an effort to bring these in line with what they judge to be best (Holton, 1999). For Gilead (1999), akratic agents maintain unconscious reasons for acting in akratic ways, and they do not in fact weigh or value the reasons behind these akratic actions.…”

Section: Contemporary Views On Akrasiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Akrasia and tourism: why we sometimes act against our better judgement?

Fennell

2015

Tourism Recreation Research

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There are many practical problems that we must come to grips with in our daily lives. Often, we are presented with options or alternatives in reference to these problems. How we weigh and choose which course of action to pursue is of obvious significance. We may choose rationally, i.e. we may choose the option that is judged to be in our best interest, or we may choose irrationally, i.e. against our better judgement. In the latter case, we would be succumbing to akrasia -demonstrating weakness of will, where the search for pleasure overwhelms good judgement. This paper applies the concept of akrasia to two tourism case studies: one, on the choice to purchase endangered animal souvenirs in Cuba, and the other on sex tourism in Costa Rica. I conclude by suggesting that codes of ethics, accreditation schemes, guidebooks and interpretive programmes have a role to play in educating tourism actors on the importance of choosing alternatives that support broader initiatives over those of a strictly personal (i.e. self-interest) nature.

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Intention and Weakness of Will

Cited by 251 publications

References 11 publications

What in the world is weakness of will?

What in the world is weakness of will?

Faiblesse de la raison ou faiblesse de volonté: peut-on choisir?

Akrasia and tourism: why we sometimes act against our better judgement?

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