No abstract

How a simple idea by reading can improve you to be a successful person? Reading is a very simple activity. But, how can many people be so lazy to read? They will prefer to spend their free time to chatting or hanging out. When in fact, reading will give you more possibilities to be successful completed with the hard works. By reading, you can know the knowledge and things more, not only about what you get from people to people. Book will be more trusted. As this willing wanting waiting, it will really give you the good idea to be successful. It is not only for you to be success in certain life you can be successful in everything. The success can be started by knowing the basic knowledge and do actions.

There is something curious about the philosophical literature on weakness of will. It is not about what one might expect it to be about. Even David Wiggins, in a discussion that has much in common with that to be given here, starts by claiming Almost anyone not under the influence of theory will say that, when a person is weak-willed, he intentionally chooses that which he knows or believes to be the worse course of action when he could choose the better course. 1

(1978) and Zeno Vendler (1980) have independently claimed that tell behaves in two different ways, depending on its complement. When it is used with a whcomplement, as in (1) The boy told them where he had spent the night it requires that the subject spoke the truth: (1) could only be correctly used if the boy had spoken truthfully. In contrast, when tell is used with a that-complement, as in (2) The boy told them that he had spent the night with friends it brings no such requirement; (2) could be used correctly even if the boy had lied about his whereabouts. In a recent paper Savas Tsohatzidis (1993) has disputed the first of these claims, that concerning the behaviour of tell with a wh-complement. He argues that Kartunnen and Vendler's account of this construction-which he dubs the K-V thesis-is refuted by the following examples:John told the voters what he intended to do for them once elected, but, as usual, he was lying to them.(4) Old John told us who he saw in the fog, but it turned out that he was mistaken.(5) John told them where he had been between 4 and 5 p.m., but he was certainly lying since nobody was at the place he said during that time.Tsohatzidis argues that each of these sentences (together with a number of others that he gives) is acceptable; yet each entails that the subject spoke falsely; so the K-V thesis is false. He goes on to explain the superficial plausibility of the K-V thesis as the result of conventions of truthfulness and trust which, on David Lewis's (1975) account, are necessary for any language. These conventions guarantee that speakers will in general tell the truth, and that hearers will in general believe them. So we might expect that when people are reported as having been told something, there is a default assumption that they have been told the truth. According to Tsohatzidis it is the existence of such a default assumption-which can be defeated by explicit indication to the contrary as in (3), (4) and (5)-that makes the K-V thesis seem plausible. If Tsohatzidis' argument were sound it would have important repercussions. For, as he points out, a considerable amount of work has been premised on the K-V thesis. However, I do not think that we should be convinced by his argument. In the first place, the explanation he gives for the plausibility of the K-V thesis appears to prove too much. If the general conventions of truthfulness and trust are enough to generate a default assumption that the subjects of tell+wh reports have spoken truly, they should equally generate a default assumption that the subjects of tell+that reports have likewise spoken truly. But there does not seem to be any such assumption; or at least it seems nothing like as strong as that governing tell+wh. There is far less reason to conclude from (2) than from (1) that the boy has spoken truly.This should make us re-examine Tsohatzidis' counterexamples. When we do so, I think we will find that they do not make a convincing case for the falsity of the K-V thesis, since they are better explained in another ...

Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief stands to all-out belief. Various coherence constraints on the notion are explored. It is concluded that the primary relations between intention and belief should be understood as normative and not essential. 8 For this criticism see Harman 1988, pp. 25-7. Put as I have put it, the complaint is overstated. Rather that assigning prior conditional probabilities to all pairs of propositions we might use Bayesian Networks, representations that implicitly assume that many factors are independent, and so drastically reduce the number of priors needed. For an introduction to Bayesian Networks, with clear discussion of this point, see Charniak, 1991. Nevertheless, the computational complexity remains outside our conscious ability. 9 The classic study here is Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; there has been much more since. See the articles collected in Kahneman & Tversky, 2000. 10 For review see Chater et al., 2006, and the articles that follow it in the same journal. 11 The comparison is from Chater et al 2006, p. 288.