Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state

Abstract

This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as (e.g.) tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while (1) merely preparing, (2) not taking any steps, and (3) the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some frogs (such as tadpoles) are immature frogs, some actions (such as intentions) are immature actions.

Pluralistic Attitude-Explanation and the Mechanisms of Intentional Action

“…If we admit that the notion ranges over distinct mental kinds, then citing the general class underdetermines how the action comes about. If one rejects both of these possibilities, one might be tempted to sign on for a non-causalist view (e.g., Dancy, 2003;McLaughlin, 2013;Russell, 2017). While I think non-causalist views have a lot to be said for them, in picking out the many distinct roles that folk-psychological explanation plays for us, I also think that explaining how agency fits into the world simply must involve describing the causal processes that lead to action.…”

Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism

“… While I follow common practice in referring to intentions as mental states, this is no more than a placeholder for a metaphysical account. Some authors place intentions the category of process or event, rather than state (Thompson, 2008; Russell, 2018). Thompson appeals to linguistic analysis (2008: 143ff).…”

“…94–95). On a common reading, this commits Thompson to the view that intending to ϕ entails that you are already ϕ‐ing, thus exposing Thompson's position to counterexamples (Setiya, 2014; Paul, 2014; Russell, 2018). The view I am proposing avoids this commitment.…”