Intention-sensitive semantics

Stokke, Andreas

doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9537-5

Cited by 40 publications

(28 citation statements)

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“…SeeDonnellan (1966Donnellan ( , 1968,Kaplan (1989Kaplan ( ), Å kerman (2009Kaplan ( , 2010,Stokke (2010), andKing (2013King ( , 2014a.6 This assumption seems common in the epistemology of testimony. However, I will argue at the end of Sect.…”

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Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Peet

2015

Philos Stud

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In the epistemology of testimony it is often assumed that audiences are able to reliably recover asserted contents. In the philosophy of language this claim is contentious. This paper outlines one problem concerning the recovery of asserted contents (the 'recovery problem'), and argues that it prevents audiences from gaining testimonial knowledge in a range of cases (even when the speaker is both sincere and a reliable belief former). The recovery problem, in essence, is simply that due to the collective epistemic limitations of the speaker and audience speakers will, in certain cases, be insensitive to the ways in which they may be misinterpreted. As a result audiences' beliefs will often fail the safety and sensitivity conditions on knowledge. Once the problem has been outlined and distinguished from several related problems in the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony, a series of responses are considered. The first response holds that audiences possess defeaters in recovery problem cases, and thus wouldn't form beliefs. The second response holds that the beliefs audiences form are very coarse grained, meaning they are not very vulnerable to failures of safety and sensitivity. The final response holds that the objects of speaker meaning are not propositional. All three responses are found to be unsatisfactory.

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Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Peet

2015

Philos Stud

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“…In response to Bach's charge that positing semantic intentions is in general implausible, I 33 See e.g. Stokke (2010), King (2013King ( , 2014aKing ( , 2014b, Speaks (2016Speaks ( , 2017. 34 For a description of the example see footnote 9.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…While different versions of this view have been put forward, Intentionalists agree that the semantic value of an intention‐sensitive expression e in a context c is an object o only if the speaker intends o to be the value of e in c (see e.g. Kaplan , Siegel , Åkerman , Stokke , King , , Speaks and Lewerentz & Marschall ).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Ways of Using Words: On Semantic Intentions

Viebahn¹

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Intentionalism is the view that demonstratives, gradable adjectives, quantifiers, modals and other context‐sensitive expressions are intention‐sensitive: their semantic value on a given use is fixed by speaker intentions. The first aim of this paper is to defend Intentionalism against three recent objections, according to which speakers at least sometimes do not have suitable intentions when using supposedly intention‐sensitive expressions. Its second aim is to thereby shed light on the so far little‐explored question of which kinds of intentions can be semantically relevant.

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“…26 26 Defenders include Kaplan (1989), Stanley (2000), Chisholm and Feehan (1977), (2004), Predelli (2005), Stokke (2010). …”

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Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading

Stokke

2013

Philosophy Compass

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This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Two new developments in this area are considered: first, the acknowledgment of the phenomenon of lying without the intent to deceive (so called ‘bald‐faced lies’), and second, recent work on the distinction between lying and merely misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions for further research are indicated.

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Intention-sensitive semantics

Cited by 40 publications

References 20 publications

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Ways of Using Words: On Semantic Intentions

Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading

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