Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality

Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality?

“…7 Thus, phenomenal character does not seem separable from the content of the experience. Kriegel (2007) openly notes that TE is perfectly compatible with, and provides evidence for, PIV:…”

“…1998; Horgan and Tienson 2002;Loar 2002Loar , 2003Horgan, Tienson and Graham, 2004;Pitt, 2004;Kriegel 2007Kriegel , 2008Kriegel , 2011Kriegel , 2013. So, experience's instantiating certain representational properties ultimately depends on its instantiation of certain phenomenal properties.…”

The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program

“…Fuller discussion of these issues cannot be attempted in this review, but clearly there are some principled obstacles in the way of a consumer-semantic account of representation-to. 20 A third distinctiveness claim that shows up often in the relevant literature is that phenomenal intentionality always involves narrow content, in the sense of being shared by intrinsic duplicates, whereas non-phenomenal intentionality often involves wide content (Loar 2003, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Horgan et al 2004, Georgalis 2006, Kriegel 2007, 2011. 21 If a kind of content internalism were generally true of phenomenal intentionality, while content externalism were commonly true of non-phenomenal intentionality, that would constitute another distinction of phenomenal intentionality.…”

“…A more lenient view allows for some non-phenomenal intentionality but claims that any such must derive from phenomenal intentionality (McGinn 1988, Kriegel 2003b, 2007, 2011. e distinction between derived and underived intentionality was brought into modern discussions of intentionality by Grice (1957), who suggested that the intentionality of language derived from the intentionality of thought: the linguistic symbol c^a^t represents cats only in virtue of bearing a certain relation to cat thoughts, whereas cat thoughts have cat-representing content in and of themselves.…”

“…One argument that can be interpreted as revolving around narrow content appeals to the phenomenon of intentional inexistence : the fact that every intentional state can occur in the absence of that which it is about. On one version of the argument (Kriegel 2007), it is claimed that only adverbially intentional states exhibit intentional inexistence in and of themselves, and then that only phenomenally intentional states are adverbial. An adverbial intentional state, being entirely non-relational, would clearly have narrow content, so this can be seen as an argument for a basicness thesis from a narrowness one.…”