Intentional Side-Effects of Action

Abstract

Certain recent experiments are often taken to show that people are far more likely to classify a foreseen side-effect of an action as intentional when that side-effect has some negative normative valence. While there is some disagreement over the details, there is broad consensus among experimental philosophers that this is the finding. We challenge this consensus by presenting an alternative interpretation of the experiments, according to which they show that a side-effect is classified as intentional only if the agent considered its relative importance when deciding on the action. We present two new experiments whose results can be explained by our hypothesis but not by any version of the consensus view. In the course of doing so, we develop a methodological critique of the previous literature on this topic and draw from it lessons for future experimental philosophy research. KeywordsIntentional action; Side-effects; Experimental philosophy; Joshua Knobe; Moral psychology Recent empirical research into the folk classification of the outcomes of actions as intentional is usually taken to show that such classification has an irreducibly normative dimension. Various interpretations of the experimental data have in common the claim that whether the side-effect of an action counts as intentional depends on some normative valence of that

Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives

“…As they do not directly bear on the topics of this article, I do not present them here. 15 Scaife and Webber (2013) wonder what exactly the ground for intentionality ascription is, in my view (as presented in Hindriks, 2008): the fact that the chairman ought to consider the environment in his deliberation, or the fact that 'the chairman believes that he ought to take it into consideration but still does not do so' (ibid., n. 2). The second fact is the explanatory factor (the first plays a role indirectly due to what I have called 'the Side-Effect Deliberation Norm', ibid., p. 633).…”

The Folk Concept of Intentional Action

“…However, we get exactly the opposite: in such cases, the side-effect is judged much more intentional (Cova 2014). Similarly, Scaife and Webber (2013) advanced the "Consideration Hypothesis," according to which people ascribe intentionality only when they think that the agent took the side-effect into consideration before acting, that is only when the agent assigned the side-effect some level of importance relative to the importance they assigned their primary objective. Second, these accounts cannot explain cases such as the Terrorist case (Knobe 2004b;Cova 2014), in which a terrorist has planted a bomb in a nightclub to kill Americans but reluctantly defuses the bomb when he discovers that his own son is in it.…”

“…If we follow accounts that consider that the Knobe Effect cannot be explained away but can nonetheless be explained without appeal to normative and evaluative considerations, then these empirical investigations do not have the revolutionary consequences Knobe expect them to have, but can still teach us interesting facts about the factors people take into account when considering an action as intentional (such as the consideration one gives to a particular side-effect; see Scaife and Webber 2013). If we follow accounts that consider that the Knobe Effect cannot be explained away but can nonetheless be explained without appeal to normative and evaluative considerations, then these empirical investigations do not have the revolutionary consequences Knobe expect them to have, but can still teach us interesting facts about the factors people take into account when considering an action as intentional (such as the consideration one gives to a particular side-effect; see Scaife and Webber 2013).…”

Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed

“…Instead, critics of this view argue, differently valenced side-effects engender asymmetric attributions of outcome-related desires (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010), beliefs (Alfano, Beebe, & Robinson, 2012), perceived norm-violations (Alfano et al, 2012; deeply held values and principles (Sripada, 2010(Sripada, , 2012Sripada & Konrath, 2011), or attention paid to the possible consequences (Scaife & Webber, 2013). The difference in ascriptions of this sort is, in turn, taken to explain the asymmetric ascription of intentionality.…”