Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence

Pautz, Adam

doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00134.x

Cited by 124 publications

(67 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…I will generally ignore such niceties in the interests of readability. 11 I should point out that the claim that all perceptual experiences possess some presentational phenomenology is compatible with what Adam Pautz argues in Pautz (2007): Pautz argues against the metaphysical claim that all perceptual experiences involve item-awareness; I am endorsing the phenomenological claim that all perceptual experiences involve seeming item-awareness.…”

Section: Phenomenology and Justificationmentioning

confidence: 86%

The nature of intuitive justification

Chudnoff

2010

Philos Stud

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In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenologyand in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions.

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Section: Phenomenology and Justificationmentioning

confidence: 86%

The nature of intuitive justification

Chudnoff

2010

Philos Stud

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“…Notice, one could say that we see color qualities directly and also by seeing qualities which are not themselves colors, but it's not clear what would support such a view. Also, notice that it's controversial whether we are ever aware at all of qualities in having visual experiences (for useful discussion, see Pautz 2007). For further useful discussion of how to clarify "direct" and "indirect" perception, see Jackson (1977) or Snowdon (1992).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If the sense-data theory were true, there would arguably then have to be something that is many-spotted, without there being a number n such that the thing is n-spotted. For further discussion, see Ayer 1940, Jackson 1977, Pautz 2007, or Tye 2009. A more germane use of the speckled hen is to challenge traditional foundationalist views in epistemology, according to which we have extremely privileged access to our experiences (this application arguably starts with Chisholm 1942).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Silins

2011

Mind

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Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world, that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the proposal that, if your experience E immediately justifies you in believing that P, then (i) E has the content that P, and (ii) E's having the content that P is fixed by what it's like to have E. I start by clarifying this proposal and showing how it can be defended. I then argue against the proposal and develop an alternative. The discussion shows what role visual consciousness plays (and doesn't play) in the justification of perceptual beliefs.

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“…One problem for this view is that it commits us to a quite substantial metaphysical thesis regarding the existence of Platonic universals simply by reflecting on our own psychology. Not anyone will be comfortable with this sort of transcendental argument (for other arguments against it see Pautz 2007). …”

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confidence: 99%

Is Attention a Non-Propositional Attitude?

Watzl¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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The first part of this chapter argues that many forms of attention and attention-entailing mental episodes, such as looking at something, watching something, listening to something, or tactually feeling something, are paradigmatic examples of non-propositional intentional episodes. In addition, attention cannot be reduced to any other (propositional or non-propositional) mental episodes. But is attention a non-propositional attitude? The second part of the chapter argues that it is not. In order to account for attention and its apparently non-propositional character we should reject a certain atomistic model of our mental life and move towards a more holistic conception. I question the assumption that a subject’s mental life should be thought of as a causally connected collection of mental attitudes. This “building-block” model of the mind does not fit the case of attention. Instead, a subject’s mental life can be partitioned along many, equally appropriate dimensions. In a slogan: mentality has priority structure, in addition to attitudinal structure.

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Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence

Cited by 124 publications

References 39 publications

The nature of intuitive justification

The nature of intuitive justification

Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Is Attention a Non-Propositional Attitude?

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