The nature of intuitive justification

Abstract

In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenologyand in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions.

Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics

“…30 E.g. Bealer (1998) and Chudnoff (2011). I am inclined to accept a narrow notion of evidence 31 that would make 2C widely applicable in philosophy; again, others will disagree.…”

Fenomenologia cognitiva

“…Dins de la opció 2a) hi trobem autors que argumenten que cal reconèixer un tipus peculiar de caràcter fenomènic que està associat al pensament (Strawson 1994;Siewert 1998;Pitt 2004;Chudnoff 2011;Smith 2011;Kriegel 2015, entre d'altres). Dins de l'opció 2b) hi trobem autors que neguen aquesta idea i, per contra, argumenten que si bé cal reconèixer que el pensament conscient té caràcter fenomènic, se "sent" o s'experiencia d'alguna manera, aquest caràcter fenomènic no és d'un tipus peculiar sinó que és del tipus sensorial o emocional, és a dir, del tipus que ja trobem en altres tipus paradigmàtics d'estats mentals fenomènics (Jackendoff 1987;Lormand 1996;Prinz 2011;Carruthers i Veillet 2011;Robinson 2005;Tye i Wright 2011, entre d'altres).…”

“…Ja s'ha esmentat abans que hi ha visions que defensen que el caràcter fenomènic podria justificar les creences sobre el tipus d'estat mental en què estem, i hi ha diversos autors que sostenen que les experiències cognitives justifiquen certes creences i constitueixen coneixement en virtut de tenir un caràcter fenomènic propi (Chudnoff 2011;Smithies 2013;Koksvik 2011). També ens podem preguntar si la fenomenologia cognitiva juga algun altre rol racional a part dels esmentats.…”

Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?

“…Arguably, the most prominent, recent proponent of the perception-intuition analogy is Chudnoff (2011aChudnoff ( , 2011b. Most recently, Chudnoff (2013, pp.…”

“…According to Chudnoff (2011b, p. 626), "Perceptualist views differ from doxastic views in that according to them intuitions are not identical to doxastic attitudes or doxastic dispositions, but lead to doxastic attitudes and doxastic dispositions when taken at face value" (emphasis added). In other words, on perceptualist views, intuitions are prima facie evidence for beliefs (see Chudnoff 2011a andHuemer 2007). In this paper, I am concerned with the epistemology-not the nature-of intuitions.…”