Intentionalism Defended

Byrne, Alex

doi:10.1215/00318108-110-2-199

Cited by 380 publications

(135 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…407 Hua XIX,p. 165,Hua III,[83][84] For example, Harman (1990), Tye (1995Tye ( , 2000 and Byrne (2001), all discuss sense data theories in formulating their view. 13 See also Hua III,pp.…”

Section: Hyletic Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology

Shim

2011

Husserl Stud

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According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia-of specifically sensory experiences-supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called ''transparency thesis.'' According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult-if not impossible-to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia-specifically, the sort that he calls ''kinesthetic sensations''-can vary despite constancy in representational content.

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“…407 Hua XIX,p. 165,Hua III,[83][84] For example, Harman (1990), Tye (1995Tye ( , 2000 and Byrne (2001), all discuss sense data theories in formulating their view. 13 See also Hua III,pp.…”

Section: Hyletic Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology

Shim

2011

Husserl Stud

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“…The representational content is the accuracy conditions of the experience, or how the experience represents or conveys matters to the subject as they undergo it. For influential defences of representationalism see Harman (1990), Tye (2000), Dretske (1995), Byrne (2001). My preferred version of representionalism is reductive representationalism, as defended by Harman, Tye, and Dretske.…”

Section: Representationalism and Qualiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Temporal Experience and Metaphysics

Peebles¹

2017

Manuscrito

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The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. I then present a representational theory of temporal experience.___________________________________________________________________________________________________

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“…Explaining Perceptual Entitlement 251 such as Tye 2000or Byrne 2001). To make the point, we consider perceptual states which have no conscious character, even though they do meet the sufficient conditions specified by Burge's account.…”

Section: The Exposition Of Burge's Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%